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are denoted through the use of apostrophes. The exceptions to this rule are terms with a common
English standard already in use and names. In Morocco, the prevalence of French spellings
complicates the issue of transliterating proper nouns, so I have generally held to the spellings most
common in Morocco today for places and persons except for those which are widely known in the
anglophone world by an English name. Thus, I use Oued Noun instead of Wad Nun, but Fez instead
of Fes or Fas.
All translations from Arabic and French are my own unless otherwise noted. I am deeply
indebted to Dr. Pamela Klasova and Dr. Meryem Belkaïd for their assistance and advice in dealing
with these sources. They both provided invaluable support for questions I had about particularly
perplexing terms and phrasing. Any errors that still remain are entirely my own.

1
Introduction: The Sultan and Siba
Moroccan historiography is haunted by the twin specters of bilad al-siba, “the land of
dissidence,” and bilad al-makhzan, “the land of government.” These two terms arose from French
colonial era theorizations of pre-colonial Morocco as divided into two parts. Supposedly, the
partition distinguished the areas that were firmly under the sway of the central royal government,
known as the makhzan, from the continually rebelling tribes that acknowledged the sultan’s
religious authority but refused his political control. In this paper, I set out to determine what in the
late nineteenth century caused later French ethnographers to label southern Morocco as part of
bilad al-siba. At first, this question seems to be exceedingly narrow and germane only to the
historiographic discourse of a single country. Ultimately, however, this paper is about something
much more universal – the nature and practice of political authority.
The makhzan/siba divide has been the focus of debate for much of the last century and a
great deal has been written on the topic. The traditional construction of the makhzan/siba
dichotomy in Western academic literature stems from French colonial scholarship which
repurposed Arabic terms to define a mostly static, territorial division based primarily on perceived
racial distinctions between Arab and Amazigh communities.1 Most French knowledge about
Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century came from the reports of French military
instructors in the Moroccan army and European travel accounts.2 These sources were then
supplemented by the work of French ethnographers from neighboring Algeria. It was with the
establishment of the Mission scientifique du Maroc in 1903, however, that French scholarship on
Morocco really took off. Led in its early years by Georges Salmon and Édouard Michaux-Bellaire, the
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Mission began producing Archives marocaines, an enormously influential publication for later
scholars. Archives marocaines may have predated the protectorate, but it was explicitly intended to
provide information on the organization of Moroccan society for colonial policy makers.3 While
there are a few prominent early examples of French scholars who opposed the idea of the
makhzan/siba binary, namely Edmond Doutté and Eugène Aubin, by 1904 Michaux-Bellaire’s view
of Morocco as two “organisms” – bilad al-siba and bilad al-makhzan – had become a matter of
orthodoxy.4
The impact of this work extended far beyond the early stages of French colonialism,
however, and the debate over the nature and even the existence of any makhzan/siba divide
continues to this day. During the period of the protectorate, the French scholar Robert Montagne
further developed and embellished this concept.5 His work then represented the foundation for
mid-twentieth century British and American anthropologists such as Ernest Gellner and Bernard
Hoffman who came to define the zones along on ethnic and linguistic lines.6 This position was then
rebutted by post-independence, nationalist Moroccan scholars, most notably Germain Ayache, who
fully dismissed the conception of bilad al-siba as merely a French colonial project to divide the
country.7 These scholars pointed to French policies toward the Amazigh Kabyle in Algeria and the
1930 Berber dahir – a colonial edict that created a separate legal structure for Moroccan Amazigh
communities – as evidence of the colonial invention of this division.8 Ayache instead described a
devolved power-sharing system in the pre-colonial period in which the sultan was mediator-inchief and rebellions were really quite rare. While Ayache’s argument that this framework arose
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3
explicitly from the colonial project is convincing, many academics objected to his complete
repudiation of any kind of internal, pre-colonial divisions. In the 1980s and 90s, scholars such as
C.R. Pennell began to critique Ayache’s stance, claiming his explanation glossed over the historical
reality that rebellions did occur with great regularity in the final decades of the nineteenth century
to the point that they that impeded the ability of the sultan to negotiate with European powers. In
rehabilitating the usefulness of a notion of pre-colonial division, Pennell pointed to ideological,
rather than racial, differences and rooted the divide in regional adherence to Shari’a law or local
custom.9 As recently as 2015, historian Jonathan Wyrtzen was still redefining the framework,
articulating the relationship between bilad al-makhzan and bilad al-siba as a kind of symbiosis in
which the two regions served as material resources for and threats to one another.10 From this
continued debate, we see how the notion of makhzan/siba continues to influence scholarship
despite the lack of a clear consensus in the literature over the reality and basis of the divide.11
From its conception, however, determining the existence and nature of this division has
been more than an academic exercise. As shown above, the makhzan/siba divide is inherently tied
to the French colonial project. Outrage over the 1930 Berber dahir, which turned the theory into
policy, is often considered the beginning of the nationalist movement in Morocco.12 Even in the time
since independence, many of the regions associated with bilad al-siba continue to be hotbeds of
discontent toward a government still run by the direct descendant of the pre-colonial sultans. In
particular, the notion of a Morocco historically separated along ethnic lines provides fuel for the
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4
nascent Amazigh nationalist movement which has increasingly challenged the governments of
North Africa in recent years.13
In this paper, I seek not to reassociate the makhzan/siba framework with any historic
reality, but rather to understand the phenomena that caused these labels to be constructed in the
first place. To this end, I have carried out a close study of southern Morocco, particularly the district
of the Sous, during a period I conceptualize as the “long reign of Hassan I.” The Sous, as one of the
regions of Morocco most strongly associated with bilad al-siba, makes for an excellent case study to
explore how the unique events of the late nineteenth century led to the development of this
concept. Bounded by the Atlas Mountains, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Sahara, the region has for
centuries attracted the interest of political powers for its fertile soil, mining potential, and ability to
control the northern stretch of the lucrative trans-Saharan trade.14 In the seventeenth century,
following the demise of the Sa’dian dynasty, the Sous, like most of Morocco, operated as an
independent principality.15 Ruled during this period from Illigh by the Emir of Tazerwalt, the tribes
of the Sous traded Sudanese gold and Sahelian ostrich feathers to the English, French, and Dutch.16
In 1670, Illigh and the Sous fell to the ‘Alawites during their rise to power and were reincorporated
into a unified sultanate, remaining a part of Morocco to this day.17
The time period examined covers the reign of Sultan Hassan I (1873-1894), an adroit
politician and member of the ‘Alawite dynasty whose skill at keeping the European powers at bay
diplomatically allowed him to focus on reforms and domestic issues. He is typically considered the
last, great pre-colonial ruler of Morocco. I have extended the dates of his reign to encompass the
entire period from 1863 when he first became responsible for government policy in the Sous on
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5
behalf of his father Sultan Muhammad IV (reigned 1859-1873) to 1900 when the regency of his
vizier Ba Ahmad, who had largely continued his policies, ended with the ascension of Hassan I’s son
‘Abd al-Aziz.18 While the traditional end date for the periodization of pre-colonial Moroccan history
is 1912, which marked the signing of the Treaty of Fez and the imposition of the French
protectorate, I believe 1900 to be a more apt date for this particular study. In addition to the
enthronement of the twenty-year-old Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who lacked Hassan I’s deft ability and
experience with government, the first French seizure of Moroccan territory with the annexation of
the ‘In Salah and Touat Oasis also occurred in 1900.19 This military incursion and the civil war
which followed caused the collapse of the central Moroccan government. Thus, comments on the
“traditional” relationship between the tribal periphery and the central power of the sultan refer to
the period of relative stability before that year.
In order to understand why French scholars came to develop the makhzan/siba framework,
it is vital to understand the backdrop against which they were examining Moroccan society. During
Hassan I’s reign, the primary issue of the day in Morocco concerned state revenue. Following
Morocco’s defeat by the Spanish in the 1860 War of Tetouan, the government was saddled with an
enormous indemnity. This obligation obliterated the royal treasury, forcing Morocco into debt.
Burdened by funds owed to European powers, while at the same time attempting to rapidly
modernize and reform the country, Hassan I and his immediate predecessors relied on income from
custom duties.20 This reliance placed control of trade at the top of the sultan’s list of policy
priorities. Trade with Europeans was confined to a handful of specially designated ports which
allowed the sultan to closely police foreign merchants and limit European interaction with the
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Moroccan hinterland.21 Chief among these cities was Essaouira, the southernmost of the royal ports
through which all trade with the Sous was intended to flow. However, Essaouira was located
significantly north of the Sous leaving the region without a local, royally sanctioned port. In
response, select local elites negotiated directly with European traders to open illegal black-market
ports that operated without paying royal customs.22 As a result, the central government repeatedly
intervened to put a stop to the practice. In this paper, I will argue that these interventions, which I
explore in the first two chapters, created debates over sovereignty that were then a key element in
the later French formulation of the makhzan/siba framework.
One of the major contributions of this work is to place this Moroccan phenomenon in the
context of the more broadly studied process of British colonialism, a task to which the third chapter
is largely devoted. During the nineteenth century, Britain, rather than France, was the dominant
European power in Morocco and most of the companies involved in establishing these black-market
ports were British. As a result, we can view the foundation of these ports through the lens of John
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s notion of British “informal empire.” Through this idea, Gallagher
and Robinson sought to explain why the British Empire grew during the mid and late nineteenth
century even as the British Foreign Office largely opposed colonial expansion.23 Closely tied to their
conception of the “imperialism of free trade,” Gallagher and Robinson posited that it was the actions
of independent British companies operating on the periphery of existing states that repeatedly
incited crises forcing the hand of the Foreign Office.24 The basic premise of their argument is that
British economic activity expanded continuously during the nineteenth century in regions outside
of the formal empire, and it was the impulse to protect these commercial interests that led to
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7
further annexations in Africa and Asia during the late Victorian era.25 The theory of informal empire
has since been nuanced and refined by subsequent scholars. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, in
particular, worked to better identify the source of Gallagher and Robinson’s “crises on the
periphery.”26 They examined more closely the agents of this informal empire, the entrepreneurial
adventurers who championed British imperialism while engaging in trade of dubious legality on the
edges of the empire. It was these men, they argue who tried to trigger British intervention by
crafting narratives that framed British free trade to be under threat from despotic local rulers.27
Though Morocco never became a British colony, I will show it was this very same process that
contributed to questions over Moroccan sovereignty in the Sous and consequently the application
of the term bilad al-siba to the region.
Before diving more deeply into the crisis over sovereignty triggered by British agents of
informal empire in southern Morocco, it is important to clarify my usage of the term sovereignty.
The meaning of the word is hardly static and has differed across time and cultural context.28
Critically for this study, during the nineteenth century, sovereignty became the dominant discourse
in Europe through which the rights of the state were articulated, as shown through the use of the
term in the 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference as well as the numerous uses of the term in
the Western travel accounts I cite in this paper.29 While I will examine the unique construction of
this concept in more detail in the second chapter, nineteenth century sovereignty with its emphasis
on state monopolies over violent force is but one way of thinking about political authority. At other
times, in other cultures, and in other contexts, different frameworks are used. Within the Islamic
world at this time, for instance, religious prestige and the ability to defend the Muslim community
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8
continued to be important sources of political authority. All ways of thinking about political
authority share a common essence, however, sitting at the nexus of power and legitimacy. At some
level, they mean that an individual or group has derived the ability to dictate the actions of other
individuals in a certain area on the basis of some form of understood right to command. The central
divisions among various forms of political authority thus fall along two axes – how power is
practiced and maintained and the source of the leader or government’s claim of the right to
command. In this paper, I will examine a couple of the ways political authority is practiced –
textually, through written correspondence and coercively, through violent force. I will also look at
the ways authority and specifically sovereignty are constructed on both external foundations
through international discourse and internal foundations through relationships with subjects.
Ultimately, I argue that the phenomenon of British informal empire in southern Morocco
caused Western powers to question the makhzan’s authority, especially its sovereignty, over these
regions. The reason for this is two-fold. On the one hand, Western merchants had a vested interest
in avoiding the sultan’s taxes which ate into their profits, so they had an economic incentive to cast
aspersions on Moroccan sultan’s right to control trade in the region through bad faith depictions,
and, given their cultural context, they used the discourse of sovereignty to do so. At the same time,
the form of political authority practiced by Hassan I was distinct from the kind of political authority
which had developed in Europe, that is sovereignty, and thus was less legible to the imperial
powers. Beyond their rhetoric impact, the pressure exerted by these British traders also led Hassan
I to actually change the kind of political authority he practiced in the Sous. Internally, he shifted
from a form of authority based on his relationship with local elites and practiced through epistolary
correspondence to a more direct incorporation of those elites within the bureaucratic structure of
the central state. At the same time, he moved to externalize his claims to authority. By embarking
on a series of military expeditions, or mahallas, Hassan I sought to reinvigorate his claims through
his Islamic role as amir al-mu’minin, or “commander of the faithful,” while demonstrating to

9
outside, especially Western, observers, that his political authority was akin or at least comparable
to sovereignty. These shifts and differing notions of political authority are relevant to the
construction of the bilad al-makhzan/bilad al-siba framework due to the textual battle that
occurred following these expeditions over the narrative. This contestation between the makhzan
and Western authors played out in diplomatic and published accounts of the mahallas. In the end,
both the makhzan and Western authors were successful to some extent. The very existence of this
debate, however, created ambiguity, at least from the Western perspective, over the sultan’s
authority, particularly his sovereignty, in the Sous. I posit this ambiguity then led directly to the
later theorization of a bilad al-siba in which the sultan was at once both sovereign and not
sovereign, as the accounts generated in this narrative contestation were the very source base used
by early French colonial scholars.

10
Chapter I
“Our Very Dear Friend”: Relations between the Makhzan and the House of Illigh (1863-1894)

Introduction
The global spread of European commercial imperialism in the second half of the nineteenth
century created both economic opportunity and domestic tensions in the regions it touched. In
southern Morocco, the adventurism of European trading companies, especially British ones, put
pressure on the relationship between the central Moroccan government, or makhzan, and the
districts on the periphery of the state. Enticed by the potential of free trade with Europe without
having to pay the duties levied by the Sultan, elite trading families began to challenge the economic
control of the makhzan by inviting Europeans to open ports in the Sous. In response, Sultan Hassan
I adjusted the type of political authority he practiced in the region in order to reassert his power
over the Sous’s economy and halt the black-market trade. Specifically, he moved from a more
relaxed, relationship-based form of authority to a more institutionalized form. This shift occurred
through changes in his relationships with key local elites like the Simlali family of Illigh, whom he
slowly incorporated directly into the makhzan apparatus over the course of a thirty-year period.
From the beginning of his relationship with the Simlalis, Hassan I relied on them as both advisors
and proxies, leveraging their local networks to shore up his authority through internal channels.
While retaining this central aspect of the relationship, Hassan I altered its structure allowing him to
practice a different form of political authority better suited to maintaining his economic control in
the face of the new European threat.
The Simlali family were the descendants of the 17th century emirs of Tazerwalt who ruled
the Sous from their seat at Illigh during a period of interregnum between the fall of the Sa’dian
dynasty and the 1670 ‘Alawite reincorporation of the region into a unified Morocco.30 Though the
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emirate of Tazerwalt was gone, the Simlalis remained prominent elites, and by the nineteenth
century, led one of the two major lefs, or tribal confederations, in the area.31 Additionally, along
with their rivals, the Bayruk family – who were centered in the region of Oued Noun further south
in the Sous – they were one of the two most prominent Moroccan players in the trans-Saharan
caravan trade.32 From 1842 until his death in 1885, Husayn bin Hashim served as the patriarch of
the family and the most powerful local leader in the Sous. Following his death, his son Muhammad
assumed this role for the remainder of the precolonial period.33
As prominent regional figures, both bin Hashim and his son maintained written
correspondence with the Sultan and other area elites and were the recipients of hundreds of letters
during the second half of the nineteenth century, which will serve as my main source for this
chapter. The sultan’s correspondence with the Simlalis is particularly central to the narrative of his
control in the Sous because of the challenges faced by the qa’ids, or governors, he appointed to the
region. By turning to local elites like the Simlalis rather than makhzan administrators to exercise his
authority in the region, Hassan acknowledged the greater efficacy of the House of Illigh’s networks
in pursuing his agenda. These letters were kept in the family archives in Illigh until they were
opened to Franco-Moroccan historian Paul Pascon in the 1980s.34 In writing this chapter, I have
used Pascon’s annotated French translations of the documents which were published by his student
Mohammed Ennaji following Pascon’s untimely death in 1985. In addition to letters from the
Simlali archives addressed to bin Hashim and Muhammad, the collection also contains several
written by them to the sultan and between members of the makhzan on matters relating to the
House of Illigh.
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Analysis of this collection of correspondence between Hassan I and the heads of the Simlali
dynasty shows a distinct shift in how the sultan wielded his political authority from his first letters
as a prince in the 1860s to his final ones just before his death in 1894. These letters, in and of
themselves, are the material substance of a kind of textually practiced political authority. The
discourse contained within them assumes the preeminence and authority of the Moroccan sultan
over the Sous and in so doing constituted his authority there. We can perhaps understand this way
of practicing political authority through the lens of J.L Austin’s theory of performative speech acts.
In Austin’s definition, certain utterances are performative. Rather than being a statement about
something, they are an action.35 In this case the “utterances” are Hassan I’s letters dictating orders
to someone he considers to be a subject – the Simlali patriarch. The recipient of the letters then
responds in a way that fulfills the formula accepting the notion Hassan I has the authority to make
such claims of him. As a result, these letters are not merely describing orders and a relationship
between a ruler and a subject, they are the orders and the relationship. Basically, because both the
sultan and local elites acted through written correspondence as though he possessed political
authority in the Sous, he did. Thus, changes in content and rhetoric of the letters reflect changes in
the kind of authority being wielded. The correspondence shows continuity in the Simlali family’s
self-identification as subjects of the makhzan and service as surrogates through which the sultan
assured his authority in the Sous. However, it also reflects a change in the basis, and therefore type,
of the sultan’s authority. At first, Hassan I’s right to command was primarily based on the sultan’s
personal relationship with the recipient, but as time progressed, this right became grounded in the
position of the recipient within the formal state bureaucracy.
To highlight this shift, I have divided the letters into three periods which represent different
stages of the transition from a personal to bureaucratized foundation. In the first period, the private
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relationship between Hassan I and bin Hashim appears to have been the basis of Hassan I’s
authority. During this phase, the two regarded one another as situationally expedient partners —
albeit with bin Hashim as the junior partner — in pursuing their respective interests in the Sous.
Hassan I called on bin Hashim’s services on an as-needed basis, utilizing his personal relationship
with the local leader to gain access to his parochial networks and knowledge base. After the failure
of this kind of authority to achieve Hassan I’s goals of ousting the European traders and reasserting
economic control in the region, however, he began to change the structure of this relationship to
facilitate a more institutionally based type of authority. In this second phase, Hassan I began to take
a more active role in the Sous, utilizing bin Hashim as a proxy for himself and starting to integrate
the family more formally into the makhzan bureaucracy. Finally, by the third stage, as shown
through Hassan I’s relationship with bin Hashim’s son Muhammad, this integration was complete.
Through Muhammad, who was officially a part of the makhzan, Hassan I wielded an institutionally
based form of authority which proved far more effective at giving him economic control. The need
for this change in Hassan I’s internal expression of political authority along with his simultaneous
efforts to externalize his claims to sovereignty — to be explored further in the next chapter —
demonstrates the way the late nineteenth century phenomena of the imperialism of free trade and
British informal empire forced the sultan to develop different modes of political authority to project
his power over the periphery of the state.

Situationally Expedient Partners (1863-1882)
While Husayn bin Hashim had previously corresponded with Hassan I’s father and
grandfather Sultans Muhammad IV and ‘Abd al-Rahman, respectively, the first documented letter
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from Hassan I to the House of Illigh dates to 1863.36 At that time, Hassan I was still Hassan Khalifa, a
prince acting on behalf of his father. During this early period of bin Hashim’s interaction with
Hassan I, the correspondence suggests that sultan employed a form of authority grounded in their
informal, personal relationship to manage his affairs in the Sous. Hassan I and bin Hashim only
appear to have activated their relationship as need arose in the pursuit of their respective interests.
While the letters show that bin Hashim saw himself as subordinate to and acted on behalf of the
makhzan, helping to enforce their trading policies, he did so chiefly when it furthered his own
economic wellbeing. For their part, Hassan I and his father used bin Hashim as a proxy in the Sous
and relied on his support. At the same time, they do not appear to have fully trusted him and
allowed the relationship to ebb when he was no longer needed. Ultimately, this style of informal,
personal relationship-based authority failed to grant Hassan I the ability to effectively rein in
European trade, leading him to begin changing the form of his political authority in the subsequent
period.
From Hassan I’s first letter to bin Hashim, the power differential and relative positions of
the two men are made clear. The sultan is unequivocally above bin Hashim, while at the same time,
bin Hashim is outside of the more formal governing structure of the makhzan. In the letter, Hassan I
addresses bin Hashim with the style “muhibbna,” following in the pattern of his father and
grandfather. This term, derived from the Arabic stem for love, is translated by Pascon as “notre ami
très cher” or “our very dear friend.” Pascon points out that within the epistolary protocols of the
period this title distinguishes bin Hashim, not as a political administrator, but rather as a renowned
man of learning, despite the political nature of the letter itself.37 The use of this title suggests that, at
the time, the ‘Alawites viewed bin Hashim as an important and useful subject, but not someone who
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was formally in charge of the Sous in any capacity. This power differential is also elucidated in bin
Hashim own letters to Hassan I from this period. Respectful and acquiescent in the extreme, bin
Hashim refers to the prince as “the one who takes the place of our lord and master” clearly
acknowledging the ‘Alawites as his rulers rather than allies.38 Through the use of these respective
titles for one another, bin Hashim and Hassan I defined their relationship in ways that reinforced
the primacy of the ‘Alawites over the Sous.
In accordance with the notion that bin Hashim recognized the authority of the sultan over
himself, Hassan I’s letters suggest bin Hashim was a frequent partner in carrying out the makhzan
agenda in the Sous. In one letter, this idea his made explicit as Hassan I reiterates the friendship his
father the sultan feels for bin Hashim. He writes: “You have taken care of the execution of orders
and the obedience and friendship you have shown have increased our master's [Sultan Muhammad
IV] desire to take care of you and compliment you… the esteem you enjoy with our master, may God
assist him, has not changed, it has even grown.”39 This passage recognizes bin Hashim’s loyalty in
carrying out royal commands and suggests that he had repeatedly acted on behalf of the sultan in
the affairs of the Sous, receiving direct orders that he then carried out. It also locates these actions
as taking place within the context of a friendship, or personal relationship rather than an
institutional structure.
Though bin Hashim may have viewed himself as a subject and often acted on the orders of
the ‘Alawite sultans, there was also a heavy dose of self-service during this period in the
relationship. At the time Hassan I’s initial letter was received, the prince was actually in the Sous
with royal troops at bin Hashim’s request. Bin Hashim had claimed his rival and relative by
marriage al-Habib Bayruk had negotiated with Spanish traders to open a port in the region, and in
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response the sultan had sent his son Hassan I to deal with the situation.40 In asking for royal troops,
bin Hashim accomplished two goals. On the one hand, he promoted makhzan interests and helped
them to enforce their trading policies, and on the other, he helped his own business by tattling on
his competitor. This kind of self-interested activation of his ties to the makhzan shows how, at this
stage, the relationship was defined by situational expedience. Both parties appear to have
interacted only as it benefited their interest. The idea that the relationship during this period was
founded on self-interest is further reinforced in a later letter from 1866 in which bin Hashim
discusses traveling to Guelmim, the seat of the Bayruk family, to lecture them on the necessity of
obedience to the sultan, on behalf of the prince. He condemns the Bayruks as greedy for seeking an
“exemption from customs duties and the monopoly of the sale of ostrich feathers to Essaouira,” yet
later on he requests these same benefits on their behalf.41 This last aspect sheds light the reciprocal
nature of bin Hashim’s relationship with the makhzan. The sultan and the prince may have used
him to pursue their agenda in the region from a distance, but bin Hashim in turn leveraged this
relationship to benefit his business interests. In summoning royal troops to deal with Bayruk he
seems to have sought to humble his rivals in trade by bringing the wrath of the state down upon
them, while in this case he used the goodwill he had accrued in an attempt to secure preferential
treatment for his relatives.
Perhaps because of the intermittent nature of the relationship at this stage there was also a
great deal of mistrust between the two parties. For example, most of the first missive relates to bin
Hashim’s concern that Hassan I and the royal forces were, in fact, seeking bin Hashim’s arrest
despite his having requested the troops, himself. After addressing other concerns, Hassan I puts bin
Hashim at ease stating, “as for the news that the slanderers have sent you, that the troops intended
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to arrest you, these are false and unfounded allegations.”42 The need for such reassurance reveals
that bin Hashim was still quite wary of the makhzan in spite of his partnership with them. The
existence of this suspicion is reinforced by the fact the bin Hashim avoided personally encountering
Hassan I. 43 Such evasive action demonstrates his standing with the makhzan to have been far more
uncertain then Hassan I’s letter suggests. This wariness seems to have persisted through this first
phase of the relationship as another exchange from 1864 reveals. The prince wrote to bin Hashem
while again preparing to lead troops into the Sous to deal with Bayruk. In this letter, Hassan I
exhorts bin Hashim to rally the local tribes to join the royal troops and to meet with him in person.
In fact, Hassan I writes “set us an appointment, which we both have to respect. Let there be no
discomfort in your chest about what you hear from slanderers.”44 In spite of this direct order, no
such meeting occurred, suggesting bin Hashim again intentionally evaded the prince, a notion
corroborated by local oral tradition.45 Hassan I’s directive also intimates that bin Hashim would
have been nervous about such a meeting, something a loyal subject would seemingly have no
reason to fear.
Following these exchanges surrounding the Bayruk, correspondence between bin Hashim
and Hassan I appears to have died down. Only five additional letters are documented in the archive
until 1880, well after Hassan I’s ascension to the throne in 1874. Those few letters mostly
acknowledge the receipt of gifts and declarations of loyalty rather than dealing with any matters of
regional policy. The lack of royal missives from this period is, in and of itself, telling of Hassan I’s
relationship to bin Hashim. Either, no letters exist, in which case the absence may suggest a cooling
of Hassan I’s relationship with bin Hashim in favor of other proxies, or letters were written only to
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be subsequently destroyed or hidden away by the Simlali family, perhaps to avoid a negative
portrayal of their ancestor when the archive was opened to historians. Pascon, himself, suggests
that Hassan I’s attention was merely turned elsewhere during these years and the dearth of letters
reflects this change in focus. 46 As correspondence slacked off, the European encroachment that the
makhzan had relied on bin Hashim to counter continued to increased, which further suggests that
this relationship was critical to the kind of political authority Hassan I was practicing in the region
at that time. In 1879, a British company led by Donald Mackenzie established a trading base at Cape
Juby on Bayruk land near Tarfaya, and bin Hashim, himself, entered into negotiations with French
merchants from Marseille to establish a competing port. Although bin Hashim ended his
negotiations with the French due to the lack of the sultan’s approval, in 1880 another group of
British merchants claimed his support for the opening of a trading post at Arksis — support bin
Hashim denied giving.47 With the failure of this personal relationship-based authority to provide
him with the tools to counter these growing threats, Hassan I was forced to change the nature of his
political authority in the region. To accomplish this task, he took more direct action, renewing his
correspondence with bin Hashim and traveling in person to the Sous on two military expeditions,
or mahallas, in 1882 and 1886 as covered in the next chapter.

Formalizing the Relationship (1882-1886)
Royal correspondence with Husayn bin Hashim recommenced in earnest with Hassan I’s
first expedition to the Sous as sultan in 1882. While the next chapter will further explore the
significance of these expeditions in Hassan I’s shift to toward externalizing his claims to sovereignty
and political authority more broadly, the epistolary record shows he also continued rely on internal
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relationships like that with the House of Illigh. In the multitude of letters exchange in the period
during and between Hassan I’s two mahallas, the sultan appears to have sought to change the type
of political authority he exercised by changing his relationship with bin Hashim. During this time,
he renewed his correspondence with Illigh and came to rely on bin Hashim as both an advisor and a
surrogate in the region. Communication became far more frequent and consistent with more than
forty letters exchanged between them in the four years between the first mahalla and bin Hashim’s
death in 1886. Over the course of this reinvigorated correspondence, bin Hashim morphed from a
periodic partner into a quasi-official of the state. Though not yet fully incorporated into the
makhzan bureaucracy, bin Hashim’s relationship to the sultan became much more formalized and
he carried out responsibilities key to statecraft such as maintaining peace between tribes, advising
royal governors, and of course combating the influence of European traders. The new more
institutionalized relational authority that developed out of Hassan I’s recasting of this relationship
better allowed the sultan to tap into bin Hashim’s local networks to project his influence and
reinforce his authority over trade.
In Hassan I’s first letter to bin Hashim while on the mahalla in 1882, the sultan immediately
sought to repair the damage the relationship had incurred in the previous decade. In
acknowledging the delegation bin Hashim had sent to pledge fealty, Hassan I writes, “you say that
you are the slave of the house, constantly supporting its allies and looking after these customers,
and even if you have shown any negligence in service or let a discrepancy or alteration in your
conduct appear, our generous Majesty turns a blind eye to defects and forgives missteps.”48 This
passage shows that Hassan I was clearly aware of bin Hashim’s duplicity but chose to rehabilitate
him rather than pursue his destruction. Hassan I’s willingness to move past bin Hashim’s
transgressions suggests the sultan saw something unique in bin Hashim that another proxy would
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have been unable to offer. I argue that this advantage was bin Hashim’s own personal, local prestige
and ties to other elites as well as his intimate knowledge of the region’s politics. As result, the sultan
moved to change the nature of the relationship rather than the actor. This fixation on repairing the
relationship also shows how central the personal dynamic between Hassan I and bin Hashim
continued to be to the form of political authority the sultan was practicing at the beginning of this
transitionary period.
Another letter from July 1882 shows these networks and Hassan I’s reliance on bin
Hashim’s local expertise more clearly. One of the major goals of the 1882 mahalla was to establish a
makhzan-controlled port in the Sous where the tribes could import European food stuffs to relieve
an ongoing famine. To this end, Hassan I appointed a new governor in the region, al-Rashidi, a loyal
member of the makhzan establishment from central Morocco.49 While al-Rashidi may have been
trustworthy, he lacked networks in and knowledge of the Sous. As a result, Hassan I wrote to bin
Hashim, saying “We have directed the latter [al-Rashidi] to consult you and act according to your
instructions, for you are the "foresight" and the pillar of the makhzan in these regions. We need to
enlighten him, advise him and assist him.”50 This letter shows Hassan I’s willingness to effectively
subordinate his own royal governor to bin Hashim in recognition of the latter’s greater regional
expertise. It also demonstrates a continued reliance of the sultan on his personal relationship with
bin Hashim in wielding authority in the Sous in contrast to a more institutionally formulated
relationship like that between Hassan I and al-Rashidi. Despite the authority he granted to bin
Hashim, however, Hassan I did not make his position official. He was merely an advisor, not a ruler
or administrator in his own right. Yet his partnership with the bureaucracy in this instance shows
the increasing proximity of the personal relationship to the institutional structures of the makhzan.
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Hassan I’s reliance on bin Hashim extended beyond having him instruct the royal governor.
The sultan, himself, requested bin Hashim’s input as the establishment of the port proceeded. In a
letter to bin Hashim announcing the decision to open a port to the Europeans at Asaca, Hassan I
invited him to contradict the decision, writing “If our views are not shared, let us be told and the
reasons explained to us.” 51 Such an invitation demonstrates the value Hassan I appears to have
placed on bin Hashim’s candid opinion. Later in the same letter, Hassan I asks bin Hashim, if the
tribal governors he has appointed to oversee and manage the port are likely to follow through on
their promises, writing “Give us your personal opinion because we make great use of your
judgements and the counsel you give us on the projects that interest these regions.”52 In this line,
Hassan I explicitly states the usefulness of bin Hashim’s advice in advancing his economic agenda.
Messages like this one show that bin Hashim’s knowledge of the region and the networks he
possessed were valuable tools Hassan I utilized to ensure his policies were implemented smoothly.
Beyond advice, in other situations bin Hashim acted as a direct surrogate for the sultan. One
of the key responsibilities of the Moroccan sultan as leader of all Muslims was maintaining the
peace between tribes.53 Multiple times during this period Hassan I fulfilled this obligation by
sending bin Hashim, rather than one of his governors, to settle a conflict between warring factions,
writing with regard to one such incident “you are the linchpin of the region, you must work to
dispel the animosity between the two parties. Apply yourself with him (may God reward you with
his favors) to resolve their dispute with great dedication.”54 In referring to bin Hashim as a linchpin,
“le pivot” in Pascon’s translation, Hassan I references bin Hashim’s networks among the elites.
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Hassan I’s use of bin Hashim, rather than an official proxy allowed him to exploit this network in
carrying out his royal responsibilities and performing his role as commander of the faithful.
Hassan I’s relationship with bin Hashim, also continued to work to the advantage of the
House of Illigh. Leveraging the sultan’s reliance on his advice, bin Hashim attempted to persuade
Hassan I to actions that benefited his personal interests. In 1883, for instance, bin Hashim
successfully obtained the release and pardon of a prisoner whose son he wished to appease. In a
letter notifying him of the pardon the sultan writes, “we have granted your intervention on behalf of
al-Hadj ‘Ali al-Qadi and have ordered his release. What could cause your disgrace would also
disgrace us and we are the first to want to avoid that.”55 This line shows the influence bin Hashim
could wield with the sultan by making clear that bin Hashim’s intercession was the primary reason
for the man’s release. Bin Hashim’s pursuit of his self-interest also extended to his counsel on the
issue of the European traders. In the same letter, the sultan mentions advice bin Hashim had given
about the deployment of troops to secure the coast against the Europeans. Rather than using royal
troops, bin Hashim suggested that the sultan “leave the soldiers together and entrust the tribes with
the mission of monitoring the points indicated.”56 While Hassan I agreed to consider this proposal,
he seems to have been skeptical and states “we have written to the servant al-Abubi to ask him if
this means seems likely to lead to the result sought.”57 Though not as successful as the first request,
given that the sultan felt the need to seek additional counsel, we still see in this suggestion bin
Hashim moving to his own advantage. With fewer troops in the area, his role as an intermediary
would have to be increased and there would be less chance of bin Hashim, himself, being caught in
any illicit dealings he might have had with Europeans. A similar motivation may have been behind
his advice to the sultan, to abandon the goal of fortifying Tiznit, which Hassan I intended to become
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a makhzan military outpost in the Sous. Ostensibly, his suggestion was based on the notion that the
residents of the city might become disloyal if a wall were built because they would feel protected. In
a response to that suggestion, the sultan wrote, “Your proposal, which is worthy of consideration,
has caught our attention. But as soon as the decision was made, the news of the opening of the work
spread. It is as if we had started and under these conditions it is not possible for us to reverse our
decision.”58 Obviously, had he wanted to, there would have been no real barrier to Hassan I’s
ceasing the construction of the fortifications. Instead, the sultan, appears to disagree but make
excuses so as to soften the blow and preserve the relationship. Bin Hashim similarly responded to
the rejection with grace stating, “We can only be sincere, give good advice, and our lord knows
better than we do that which needs to be done.”59 This exchange, in addition to showing bin
Hashim’s maneuvering, demonstrates that both parties, even when opposed on a given policy,
attempted to keep the relationship on the best terms possible. This desire continues to suggest that
the personal aspect of this relationship remained significant in the construction of the sultan’s
authority in the Sous.
After the matter of the port was settled, the fortifications constructed, and Hassan I
returned to his court, we might assume the relationship would again abate as it had following
Hassan I’s expedition two decades prior. In this period, however, the strength of this relationship
was maintained through bin Hashim’s son Muhammad whom he sent to the sultan with gifts and
pledges of loyalty. Later, in 1884, Hassan would respond by making Muhammad an official makhzan
qa’id, or provincial administrator.60 By incorporating bin Hashim’s eldest son into the makhzan
ruling apparatus, Hassan I began the formalization of his relationship with the House of Illigh. Given
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his distance from the Sous in the northern courts of Marrakesh, Fez, and Meknes, Hassan I relied
heavily on bin Hashim for news of the region. In particular, he provided the sultan with critical
intelligence about the doings of the British merchant companies. In a letter in which Hassan I
acknowledged the receipt of such information, the sultan writes “we received your letter in which
you brought to our knowledge that… the Christian settled in the land of the Sbuya [a tribe near
Arksis] received a steamer… that the people of the Sbuya tribe had come to the Christian, that they
had built him a large pen in the center of which he had placed his tent, [and] that they had
appointed him sixty infantrymen as a guard each night.”61 Intelligence missives like this one, which
reveals the treachery of the Sbuya tribe and their support of the British enterprise, were critical to
Hassan I’s ability to keep tabs on this peripheral region of the state. By mid-1884, Hassan I’s trust in
bin Hashim’s information had grown to the point that he promised “in the future we [Hassan I] will
share with you [Husayn bin Hashim] all the news, true or false, that will reach us on these regions
so that you can confirm it and verify its accuracy.”62 This line is a remarkable promise to someone
who was not actually a member of the sultan’s government and shows that Hassan I had come to
trust bin Hashim deeply, perhaps more than his own governors. It also demonstrates the way the
relationship was becoming more institutionalized. In fact in 1885, two makhzan governors along
with the elites of the groups they governed arrived at Illigh where Hassan I ordered bin Hashim to
reconcile the tribes.63 By turning to bin Hashim as arbiter rather than the royal governor, Hassan I
demonstrated that at this point the sultan considered him the foremost surrogate of the makhzan in
the Sous in spite of his lack of an official position within the administration.
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The changes in Hassan I’s relationship with bin Hashim during these years reflect an
institutionalizing impulse. Though bin Hashim never became a formal member of the makhzan, he
clearly developed into a kind of quasi-official. His responsibilities included many of the aspects of
statecraft that the makhzan governors normally oversaw, but that he was better suited to carry out
in the Sous given his knowledge of and connections in the region. This status was also reflected in
the fact that upon his death in November of 1886, his son Muhammad sent an emissary to deliver
condolences to the sultan.64 This practice, typically reserved for those who served the sultan in
some official role, suggests that to Muhammad, at least, his father’s relationship to the sultan was
servile and formal enough to warrant this tradition.65 In beginning to formalize his relationship
with bin Hashim, Hassan I also changed the kind of political authority he practiced in the Sous.
Rather than a form of authority based on a personal relationship that was only periodically
exercised, Hassan I shifted to a kind of authority in which his correspondence with regional elites
was consistently maintained and regularly utilized as part of the state governing apparatus.

Extension of the Makhzan (1886-1894)
Given the significance of specific individuals in a relationship-based model of authority, bin
Hashim’s death marked the beginning of a new era in Hassan I’s practice of political authority in the
Sous. Following the death of Husayn bin Hashim in 1886, his son Muhammad became the new
leader of the Simlali family. Because he was already an official qa’id, his assumption of his father’s
role as patriarch meant that the House of Illigh was at last formally a part of the makhzan state
apparatus – the culmination of Hassan I’s shift toward an institutionally based form of political
authority in the region. This new kind of authority proved far more effective in allowing Hassan I to
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achieve his goal of repulsing the European traders and regaining economic control over the region.
Even while bin Hashim was still alive, Hassan I had begun corresponding more and more with
Muhammad, whose relationship with the sultan differed greatly from his father’s as a result of his
official position within the makhzan. While he continued to be a critical source of regional
intelligence and a surrogate for the sultan in local matters, Muhammad was far more oriented
toward the central state than his father, and he proactively pursued makhzan interests. Through his
close, institutionalized relationship with Muhammad, Hassan I was finally able to regain control of
the Sousi economy for the remainder of his life.
From the beginning of his relationship with Muhammad, Hassan I sought to ensure the
continuity of his relationship with the House of Illigh. In an early letter from 1886 he reassured
Muhammad that he would inherit the good standing his father had cultivated, writing “You occupy
with us the same rank as him and the same place. May God lead you on the right path, put you on
the same footing as your father, and make of you his most worthy successor.”66 From this
statement, we see that Hassan I viewed his relationship with Muhammad as a continuation of the
relationship he had developed with bin Hashim. Rather than a completely new dynamic,
Muhammad’s greater integration with the makhzan was the end result of the formalizing efforts
Hassan I had begun in his relationship with bin Hashim. This continuity also played out in the kinds
of responsibilities Muhammad took over from his father on behalf of the sultan. He still primarily
helped to provide intelligence to the sultan and used his networks to maintain the peace and
mitigate the presence of European traders. In February 1889, for instance, he wrote that “Dahman
bin Bayruk [had] headed with his company, soldiers and others, to the port of Tarfaya, with a view
to demolishing it and dispersing those who trade there with the Christians.” 67 After attacking the
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traders, Muhammad reports that Bayruk’s men were thwarted by nomadic tribes who defended the
fort until they left.68 This letter demonstrates that Illigh was still a vital source of information about
the continuing presence of Mackenzie’s company. Additionally, the contents of the update suggest a
change in the temperament of at least one member of the Bayruk family toward the European
traders. In fact, Muhammad was a key intermediary for the sultan in bringing the Bayruk in line. In
a later letter, Muhammad wrote to Hassan I stating “that one of the Bayruk sons named Bashir
[Dahman], who is in the port of Tarfaya asked to meet his generous Majesty through his
[Muhammad’s] mediation... and what forced him to maintain commercial relations with Christians
was the injustice of his uncle. He asks to confer on the subject of Christians, etc.” 69 This overture
toward the sultan via Muhammad on the topic of the European traders, highlights the importance of
Muhammad’s position as middleman in facilitating the expulsion of these groups, one of Hassan I’s
key goals in the region. Like his father, he also acted as a surrogate for the sultan in negotiating
between warring tribes. In 1891, for instance, he apparently traveled “to Oued Noun, in order to try
to appease [a] quarrel among the Tekna and conclude peace among them.”70 By leveraging his
connections in the service of the makhzan, Muhammad, like bin Hashim before him, was able to
extend the sultan’s authority to the far reaches of the state even in the absence of Hassan I.
Muhammad, however, was both much closer and more subordinate to the sultan than his
father. This change is reflected in Hassan I’s use of a different style in addressing Muhammad.
Rather than the title of muhibbna, the sultan consistently referred to Muhammad in his letters as
“our very well-behaved servant” or another variation on “servant.”71 This change in address
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between father and son reiterates that Muhammad was fully within the makhzan system and
worked for the sultan in an official capacity. For his own part, Muhammad cleaved much more
closely to the sultan and exercised less autonomy than his predecessor. For example, taking
advantage of Hassan I’s presence during the 1886 mahalla, Muhammad requested the sultan’s
intercession in a personal dispute. He asked the sultan “that he [Hassan I] in person reconcile us
(with them), to cut short the continual increase in the dispute between us and against them, and to
answer for us in all things.”72 He says that “we have opted for the elimination of these abuses
through our lord, so that security and trust can be achieved for us and for them.”73 By laying this
judgement before the sultan, Muhammad sacrificed some of his autonomy as a local leader, but the
decision to do so demonstrates his faith in the support of Hassan I. His explanation as to why he
was seeking royal mediation also speaks to the notion that he viewed Hassan I as above both
himself and his disputants in such a way that would permit both parties to trust in the verdict.
Similarly, Muhammad was more prone to consulting the sultan on local issues as in a letter from
1888 that requested “that he [The sultan] prescribe to us what should be done on this subject [the
murder of a local woman].”74 This greater submission was also reflected in Muhammad’s business
pursuits. In one of Muhammad’s first requests to the sultan on behalf of the House of Illigh he asked
for a house in Essaouira which would have facilitated his ability to trade there. Seeking greater
investment in Essaouira suggests Muhammad was less interested in trying to open up his own ports
in the Sous than the prior generation and more firmly committed to operating within makhzan
authority.
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This greater seeming subordination may also simply be reflective of a greater degree of
closeness between the sultan and the House of Illigh at the time Muhammad took over as the
family’s leader. By 1886, In contrast to the mahalla of 1882 which had been preceded by decades of
frigidity between the House of Illigh and the sultan, the relationship between the sultan and the
Simlalis was the warmest it had ever been. This friendship is evidenced by a letter from Hassan I
following the reception at Illigh of his son, the future Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. In this letter Hassan I
writes, “in all ways you are ours, you count among the people who enjoy our affection. Your house
is our house, your home, ours."75 This expression of warmth appears to show that a deep and
abiding connection between the sultan and the House of Illigh had been formed by this point in
contrast to the mistrust that had characterized the early relationship between the two. The sheer
volume of communication in the period following Hassan’s return north after the mahalla also
demonstrates a greater closeness. Hassan I encouraged much more frequent updates from
Muhammad, ordering the qa’id to keep him up to date on the happenings in the Sous. His letters
from this period frequently include lines like “you did the right thing by informing. Don't deprive us
of any news.”76 It is hard to say if such commands were indicative of what the sultan felt was too
little information coming through or simply a blanket reminder of Muhammad’s responsibility as an
informant. Nevertheless, they show that far from letting the relationship slip, Hassan I wanted to
hear regularly from the new patriarch of Illigh. These admonitions seem to have been effective, as
the average number of letters per year exchanged between the two and documented in the
collection nearly doubled over the next few years. Muhammad also took to heart the order not to
deprive the sultan of any news, sending frequent, brief updates even when little was happening. A
missive from one such period reads “there is nothing new in these regions that can cause concern,
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except that God, whose name is blessed and exalted, has filled his servants with blessings and sent
upon them rains as their lands have become green and fertile… similarly, prices have fallen, and
Muslims lead a gentle and quiet life.”77 This regular correspondence on relatively mundane matters
stands in stark contrast to the letters Hassan I exchanged with bin Hashim, which chiefly concerned
only the most pressing issues such as wars between the tribes and the doings of the European
traders. Muhammad’s greater back and forth as well as his greater tendency to appeal to the
sultan’s judgement show he was far more firmly integrated into the makhzan system than his
father. There were certainly limits to Muhammad’s ability to act as a proxy for the sultan, however,
perhaps because more of his power was ultimately derived from Hassan I, rather than his own,
regional legitimacy. At times, these limitations forced the sultan to interfere directly. In one letter,
the Hassan I gently chastised Muhammad for asserting his good relation with the zawiyas, or
religious brotherhoods, when he was unable to prevent tax evaders from taking shelter in one and
was forced to ask the sultan for a royal order of cessation.78 In spite of small incidents like this one,
though, Muhammad appears to have been an extraordinarily effective surrogate for the sultan.
One of the key differences to emerge from the greater institutionalization of Muhammad’s
relationship to Hassan I was his proactivity on behalf of the makhzan. Following his father’s death,
and a brief slump in communications after the end of the 1886 mahalla, Muhammad set about
trying to increase his ability to serve his now distant master. To this end, he tried to repair his
family’s relationships with other elites. For instance, in August 1888 he wrote the sultan, stating
“reconciliation took place between us and him [al-Dlimi, an important member of the Sousi elite],
which has cut short the continual increase in disagreement, the breakdown of relations, and the
mutual abandonment that took place between him and my father… we submitted to it having
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regard toward mutual aid with him in the affairs of the makhzan.”79 In this passage, Muhammad
explicitly links his attempts at reconnection to his ability to serve the makhzan. As Pascon notes,
Muhammad obviously understood the needs of the state in the Sous and built his network in order
to facilitate its goals.80
In addition to his involvement on behalf of the sultan’s interests in controlling coastal trade,
Muhammad sought to expand the makhzan’s involvement in the local economy. For instance in
1890, he advised the sultan “that there [were] two copper and lead mines in the mining region of
the Sous” and suggested the sultan “take possession of this (the deposits) for the public treasury.” 81
This initiative on behalf of the central government went far beyond anything his father did. More
than simply following orders and providing intel on the politics of the region, Muhammad actively
promoted the state’s control over economic production. Muhammad’s efforts on the sultan’s behalf
were not unrewarded, in the case of the mines, Hassan I put him personally in charge of extraction,
so it is possible to see his actions in the light of pursuing his own interests in addition to those of
the state. Either way, Muhammad clearly saw his fate as closely linked with that of the central
government.82
The overall effectiveness of this shift in Hassan I’s mode of political authority to a more
institutional variety through the formalization of his relationship with the patriarchs of the Simlalis
is perhaps best demonstrated in an episode involving the British traders from near the end of
Hassan I’s life. The success of the sultan’s agenda in this case can be directly traced to mutual trust
created by the nature of his relationship with Muhammad. First, Muhammad immediately reported
to the sultan when European ships appeared on the Sousi coast. This early warning allowed Hassan
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I to “enact[] our sharifian order to our servants, the governors of the tribes of the ports of the Sous,
who are responsible for their (ports) protection, to pay full attention to bring order there,
estimating their numbers and selecting their recruits.” 83 This preparation meant that the garrisons
of the Sous would be prepared to rebuff any Europeans who might attempt to make land fall for the
purposes of smuggling. The sultan then placed Muhammad in charge of this defense ordering him to
“assist them [the governors] in this mission and support them in reestablishing order… until our
sharifian order is carried out in accordance with its provisions .”84 In the thick of the affair,
Muhammad received a letter from Mackenzie and the North West Africa Company that stated “we
are willing if you approve this [offer] to conclude a treaty of trade with you that will bring us profit,
you and us, by the power and strength of God.”85 Rather than be tempted by this offer, however,
Muhammad doubled down on his defense of the coasts. When emissaries of the sultan came to Illigh
after visiting the coastal towns of the Sous and reported that all was being conducting in accordance
with the sultan’s orders, Muhammad followed up. He then wrote a letter to the sultan stating “We
investigated the reality of the affair and we found that it was the opposite of what they had
reported to us. In fact, the guard in these ports has been interrupted for years to the present day.” 86
Muhammad then went so far as to suggest “that some of the soldiers settled in the territory of the
Ait Ba ’Amran and Oued Noun should be distributed in these ports and established there… for
guarding the tribes, without the army being enjoined, it is a difficult undertaking for them and
cannot hold.”87 Not only does he suggest policy to the sultan, demonstrating his role as an advisor,
his suggestion is in direct contrast to that of his father’s more self-interested advice of the decade
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before. Muhammad calls for additional makhzan soldiers to guard the coasts, showing his
dedication to the sultan’s agenda even after receiving a potentially lucrative offer from Mackenzie
who had previously bought off a number of other elites.88 In the margins of this letter, Pascon notes,
the sultan has written “he [Muhammad] showed the way, may God lead him; put it into practice.”89
This note clearly demonstrates the sultan’s whole hearted approval of Muhammad’s actions. In
response, Hassan I demonstrated his trust by placing Muhammad over the other governors of the
region to ensure his orders were carried out.90 This position made Muhammad officially the most
powerful man in the Sous, what Pascon terms a “super-governor.”91 In his new role, Muhammad
investigated the other governors further and suggested to the sultan “it is appropriate to send them
a reprimand on the part of our master, because they are negligent with regard to custody, contrary
to what is proposed.” 92 Beyond this suggestion, Muhammad even reportedly “engaged in a struggle
with the al-Afrana for their refusal and opposition to carry out makhzan service.”93 From these
actions, it is clear that in shifting approaches, Hassan I had developed a powerful servant, loyal to
the state and capable of leveraging his networks and relationships to promote the sultan’s authority
in the Sous by reining in the tribes and policing trade. Through a new more institutional form of
political authority expressed in the formalization his relationship with Muhammad, Hassan
managed to project his power through internal channels to control this peripheral region far more
effectively than he had been able to three decades prior.
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Conclusion
In response to the growing threat of European companies conducting illicit, untaxed trade
with the elites in the Sous, during the second half of the nineteenth century, Sultan Hassan I drew
on his political authority in an attempt to exert power over the local economy. By using the
patriarchs of the House of Illigh as proxies in the region, Hassan I attempted to leverage his
authority to restore makhzan control over trade with the Europeans. At first, the more personal
relationship-based form of political authority the sultan employed struggled to meet his aims,
requiring his direct interference and the externalization of claims of political authority through the
mahallas. Later, however, through the increasing formalization of his relationship with Husayn bin
Hashim and his son Muhammad, Hassan I managed a complementary policy of promoting his
authority internally by leveraging the connections of the House of Illigh within the Sous. While bin
Hashim remained self-interested, often dealing behind the sultan’s back, particularly during the
cooling of the relationship in the 1870s, following the mahalla of 1882, Hassan I cultivated a more
formalized relationship with him that led to a new institutionalized type of political authority. This
new form of authority, cemented in the governorship of bin Hashim’s successor Muhammad,
ultimately proved far more effective in achieving the sultan’s agenda of halting the black-market
European trade.
As surrogates of the makhzan the Simlalis acted as mediators between tribes on the sultan’s
behalf, provided intelligence on events in the Sous, and, most importantly, policed trade with the
Europeans. While the proximity of British companies like Mackenzie’s North West Africa Company
tempted Sousi leaders with the promise of wealth through direct, tax free trade agreements with
European companies, the sultan was able to dampen enthusiasm for the trade by projecting his
authority internally through the networks of the Simlali family. This new strategy coupled with the
externalization of the question of authority succeeded in securing the Hassan I’s dominance over
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the Sousi economy for the duration of his lifetime. At the same time, his reliance on forms of
political authority that differed from those practiced in the West had already planted the seeds for
Europeans to contest his claims.
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Chapter II
On the Road: Competing Visions of the Mahalla
Introduction
This chapter overlaps chronologically with the one before, but rather than looking at
changes between forms of political authority rooted in domestic relationships, this section will
examine Hassan I’s attempts to externalize his claims to authority. In the context of political
authority, externalization consists of grounding the basis of the right to command in the recognition
of that right by outside powers. To demonstrate this attempt at externalization, I will focus on the
three great military expeditions of Hassan I to southern Morocco – the 1882 and 1886 mahallas to
the Sous and the 1892 mahalla to Tafilalt. These expeditions reflected Hassan I’s attempts to
practice different kinds of political authority for the benefit of different observers. Furthermore, the
textual accounts of these mahallas show us the ways narrative contestation became increasingly
critical as Hassan I was forced by the continued economic incursion of European powers to turn
toward the external recognition of other states as an important basis for establishing his political
authority.
The three great expeditions represented unique opportunities for authors, both Moroccan
and Western, to define the sultan’s authority over the southern edges of his state. Because he came
into direct contact with the tribes that inhabited these zones far from the royal capitals, these
mahallas were a rare opportunity to observe and comment directly on the underlying relationship
between the sultan and those areas. Through the diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic documents such
as official histories, travelogues, and consular reports that stemmed from these observations,
authors competed to craft narratives to either legitimize or cast aspersions on the sultan’s authority
over these southern borderlands in accordance with their political agendas. Western diplomats
wrote to facilitate the colonial project, while Moroccan accounts tried to oppose it. In other words,
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these documents served as political tools in the diplomatic confrontation between Morocco and the
imperial powers.
These narratives also reveal a fundamental difference between how Western and Moroccan
observers understood political authority. Western authors implicitly defined political authority in
terms of state control over the economy and violent force — a discourse tied to the European
notion of sovereignty. This Western conception of the state, which would find its best articulation in
the work of the German sociologist Max Weber, developed from the political shifts in Europe during
the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the West came to establish a unique definition of political
authority, which it referred to as sovereignty, in which the right to command individuals was
delegated to a state based on its bureaucratic capability to implement a complete monopoly on
violence in a defined geographic space.94 The choice of this metric for political authority, however,
cannot be wholly detached from the desire of imperialists to deny legitimacy to rulers like the
sultan, as shown by its use in documents like the 1885 Treaty of Berlin that set out the framework
for the “Scramble for Africa.”95 In contrast, within the Islamic context, religious prestige and the
ability to defend the Muslim community continued to be important bases upon which political
authority could be established. This construction, though dating back to the earliest Islamic
caliphates, was especially salient during the nineteenth century as Islamic states increasingly fell
under European — and more concerningly Christian —control.96 In addition to reflecting these
divergent understandings of political authority, the authors also show Hassan I’s awareness of the
increased importance of the European construction of sovereignty. The descriptions of his
expeditions demonstrate how he attempted to adapt older tools such as the mahalla in order to
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perform political authority in novel ways that would be legible to audiences domestically and
abroad.
Hassan I spent about a quarter of his reign on mahallas, meaning that they were a central
component of his statesmanship. Translated literally, the term mahalla means “encampment,”97 but
it is more often rendered as “expedition,” especially in the Moroccan context.98 It is also used
interchangeably with another Arabic term harka which refers more specifically to a military
operation and carries ideas of movement.99 Most frequently these expeditions were from one of his
four capitals – Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, and Rabat – to another, passing through the lands of tribes
such as the Beni Musa and the Beni Hassan in order to maintain the peace.100 At the same time, he
would collect taxes and receive reaffirmations of loyalty from local notables in the form of a
ceremony known as the bay’a, which has its origins in the oaths of allegiance sworn by the
companions of the prophet Muhammad.101 During the bay’a, important regional figures would
gather in a public space to acknowledge the authority of the sultan and his status as caliph
according to the Sunni tradition.102 The core of Hassan I’s troops on these mahallas consisted of his
elite soldiers – the ‘askar nizami [regular military]. The product of Hassan I and his father’s efforts
to reform the royal military, this corps was equipped with modern weapons and trained by
European and Ottoman instructors.103 In addition to nearly five-thousand ‘askar nizami, the
mahallas included eleven to twelve-thousand irregular troops and cavalry sourced from loyal
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tribes.104 The sheer size of these troop movements made them extremely costly for the makhzan to
field. The burden often fell most heavily, however, on the tribes whose territory they passed
through, as these hosts were obligated to care for and feed the sultan’s troops.105 These supplies
were extracted in the form of a muna [provisions] – a traditional offering of livestock, grain, and hot
food given to the sultan or visitors under his protection by the chieftains of the lands in which they
were traveling.106
Mahallas were not unique to Hassan I, however. Such expeditions have a long history in in
Morocco and the Islamic world. The practice of the mahalla has origins in the early Islamic empires,
even in the conquests of Muhammad, himself. This kind of military excursion and the idea of an
itinerant ruler formed a critical element in the expansion of Islam.107 For the ‘Alawite dynasty in
particular, the idea of what Moroccan anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi terms a “peripatetic
center” was crucial to basic governance. 108 This kind of mobile power hub provided the sultan with
a means to suppress dissent among the many internal factions of the state. Since the beginning of
the dynasty, all previous sultans had undertaken such expeditions, just not with the frequency of
Hassan I.109 Furthermore, Hassan I adapted this tool in novel ways to address the distinct
challenges he faced at the end of the nineteenth century.
The three expeditions addressed in this chapter were unique for a number of reasons that
demonstrate how Hassan I revamped the mahalla to meet the new challenges of this period. Rather
than journeys between centers of makhzan power, as was typical of earlier expeditions, they were
excursions to the parts of the Moroccan state most distant from the seats of ‘Alawite authority.
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Additionally, these mahallas were mostly self-sufficient, bringing food and supplies along with
them, rather than relying on local tribes.110 Actual fighting was quite limited, which shows the three
expeditions served a purpose beyond the simple suppression of armed rebellion. Instead, I will
argue that the sultan used these mahallas to make the makhzan political authority over the
periphery of his state legible to both domestic opposition and Western powers.
This chapter draws from a number of primary source materials dating from the late
nineteenth century. In particular, I will compare the account of a makhzani historian with European
travelogues and American consular reports from the same period. This selection of sources will
allow me to interrogate how different actors portrayed Hassan I’s mahallas in accordance with
their political agendas. Additionally, the varying emphases of these texts will show how Hassan I
used these expeditions to cater to the differing notions of political authority in the Western and
Islamic contexts. Both kinds of accounts reveal that during this period, trade with Europeans was
the central source of tension between Hassan I and the tribes of southern Morocco. Where the
accounts diverge is in their characterization of the mahalla and the independence of the southern
tribes. On the one hand, the official Moroccan account depicts these mahallas to southern Morocco
as largely peaceful restorations of royal, political authority in rebellious regions of the sultanate,
while Western sources describe these expeditions as largely predatory attempts to subjugate
independent groups. As in the case of the letters from the previous chapter, these diplomatic and
quasi-diplomatic documents can be viewed as constitutive speech acts. Because in an externalized
model of political authority, the perception and acceptance of outside powers is the basis of the
claim to authority, in writing narratives of the existence or absence of political authority
documentarians were actually helping to establish that very existence or absence. Ultimately, these
accounts, in chronicling the mahallas of Hassan I, became sites of narrative contestation about the
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legitimacy of the sultan’s claims to authority over southern Morocco and critical components in the
transformation of that authority to an externalized model.

Ports, Profits, and Politics: The 1882 Mahalla to the Sous
The initial mahalla I will examine is that to the Sous in 1882. This expedition was largely a
political campaign to counter increasing European influence in the Sous, which grew in the period
following Morocco’s loss of the War of Tetouan in 1860.111 During the expedition, the sultan was
accompanied by 25,000-40,000 soldiers and fifteen to thirty artillery pieces.112 In a departure from
the norm for mahallas, the sultan did not require the Sousis — rendered destitute by a famine that
swept through the region that year – to feed his army. Instead, a ship supplied the forces from the
sea.113 Despite this large number of troops, very little fighting occurred. Rather than military action,
Hassan I appointed governors, received oaths of loyalty (bay’as), gathered taxes, re-establish a
makhzan base at Tiznit, and constructed a port at Asaca.114
The first account I will analyze is that of the Moroccan chronicler Ahmad ibn Khalid alNasiri found in his magnum opus Kitab al-istiqsa li-akhbar duwal al-maghrib al-aqsa [The Book of
Investigation for News of the Nations of the Islamic Far West]. First published in Cairo in 1894, the
complete volume covers the entire history of the Maghrib from the Arab conquest in the 700s until
the ascension to the throne of Abd al-Aziz, the son of Hassan I in 1894. 115 The author, al-Nasiri, was
born in Salé in 1835 to a notable family and spent much of his life as a makhzan official. He held
various rolls in the customs service, the royal household, and as a superintendent of state
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possessions before returning to Salé where he taught and wrote several books.116 He combined the
role of a civil servant and a historian, which places al-Nasiri in a long tradition of scholars in the
Islamic world whose works functioned as quasi-legal documents that facilitated state power. Kitab
al-istiqsa is a particularly noteworthy tome for a number of reasons. In addition to providing a
firsthand account of the reign of Hassan I, it was one of the earliest Moroccan attempts to produce a
general history of the country. It was also the first Moroccan history to reference European sources
and to be read by European orientalists immediately upon its publication.117 Because al-Nasiri was
writing for both Arab and European audiences, the book heralded a new period in Moroccan
historiography. Al-Nasiri was a member of the makhzan at the time these events occurred, so he is a
first-hand witness to the royal perspective. His narrative even includes direct quotes from Hassan I
that illuminate the sultan’s intentions.118 Given the author’s background and connection to Hassan I
– the book is actually dedicated to him – the narrative in Kitab al-istiqsa, particularly for the
nineteenth century, reflects the viewpoint of the makhzan.119
Al-Nasiri and Western writers tend to agree on most of the details of the 1882 mahalla to
the Sous, but they differ greatly in terms of how they portray the expedition’s intent. As a loyal
member of the makhzan, al-Nasiri crafted his narrative in accordance with the political needs of the
sultan. In particular, al-Nasiri describes the mahalla in such a way as to combat any doubt of the
Hassan I’s political authority over the region, especially from an Islamic standpoint. Notably, alNasiri uses the term ghazw, rather than mahalla or harka, when referring to the sultan’s
expedition.120 A term heavily steeped in the tradition of the Islamic conquest, ghazw is most often
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translated as “invasion,” “raid,” or “assault.”121 The decision to use this term is significant as it links
this expedition to the battles of the Prophet which are often referred to by the same root.122 AlNasiri’s audience would have been deeply familiar with the connotation of this word and so would
have associated these expeditions with the religious element of the sultan’s authority.
In addition to his choice of terminology, al-Nasiri depicts the mahalla, after its arrival in the
Sous, as consisting primarily of meetings between Hassan I and various local notables.123 He spends
a large section of his account depicting oaths of loyalty. He describes the “tribal elders, notables,
and sheiks” of the region as “organized in lines of listening and obedience and collective service”
and states that “their sharifs and their marabouts prostrated themselves in recognition before our
Most Honored [the sultan].”124 He also states that other important figures “stretched the necks of
deference and extended the hands of peacefulness [to Hassan I].”125 This emphasis on obedience
and deference highlights the allegiance and loyalty of the region to Hassan I. In particular, the
reference to the local sharifs and marabouts’ recognition of Hassan I is important as both groups
had the potential to compete with the sultan’s religious authority. The sharifs, like the sultan, often
referred to as his Sharifian Majesty, were direct descendants of the prophet Muhammad and thus
had the similar claims to divine blessing (or baraka) as Hassan I.126 Marabouts were also important
local religious figures akin to saints in the North African context. While not necessarily of
Muhammad’s bloodline, marabouts possessed baraka which manifested in great religious devotion
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or miraculous acts.127 By dwelling on the submission of these key political and religious figures, alNasiri emphasizes Hassan I’s supremacy within the Islamic community as the amir al-mu’minin or
commander of the faithful. This title, held by the ‘Alawite sultan to this day, underscores the
personal religious authority of the sultan and his claim to be the rightly guided leader of all
Muslims.128 Both sharifs and marabouts possessed elements of religious legitimacy due to their
possession of baraka, so by depicting their deference, al-Nasiri helped Hassan I to co-opt their
authority to shore up his own according to the Islamic conception.
Al-Nasiri also reaffirms the sultan’s Islamic political authority in his description of the
appointment of judges during the mahalla. In al-Nasiri’s words, following the expedition “we [the
makhzan] were in charge of them through judges including enough to establish the divine teachings
of religion.”129 This action, like the oaths of fealty, demonstrated the power of the sultan over the
region, as the judges Hassan I appointed would continue to project his influence and rule after the
sultan himself returned north. As in his descriptions of the oaths of loyalty, al-Nasiri reminds his
reader of the religious basis for Hassan I’s authority, appealing to Islamic notions of political
authority. In mentioning the appointment of judges, al-Nasiri presents the sultan performing the
role of a proper Muslim ruler, whose foremost concern is the appropriate practice of Islam. For
those Muslim critics of Hassan I who were concerned by a number of his reforms, particularly those
they saw as concessions to the Europeans, this description would speak to the sultan’s fitness as a
ruler.130
In depicting Hassan I’s construction of a new port, al-Nasiri shows his awareness of the
need to present the sultan’s political authority to a European audience as well. According to alNasiri, “[the sultan] opened the port in Oued Noun at place called Asaca on the land of the two
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tribes, the Takna and Ait Ba ’Amran. With its opening, it creates a sound defense and facilitates
selling and buying for the people of that place.”131 This aspect of his narrative addresses certain
aspects of the Western notion of sovereignty at this time. By showing the sultan as the source of
economic infrastructure and a facilitator of capitalist markets, al-Nasiri speaks to the Western
conception of a sovereign state’s ability to impact the economy and a modern state’s support for
capitalism. As a scholar who was in active exchange with Europeans, this passage demonstrates alNasiri’s contribution to Hassan I’s project of making makhzan authority legible to both the Islamic
world and Europeans. Yet, al-Nasiri is careful to claim that the motivation for the mahalla was not
completely economic. He writes, “the more important goal than these blessed aspects was the
protection of the sacred honor of these Muslims and the defense of their lands and their necks and
their money from those [Europeans] who aspired to it.”132 By portraying the event in this way, alNasiri returns to Islamic notions of political authority, making the case that the mahalla was
essentially protective in nature, rather than a means of acquiring territory. As a result, the mahalla
becomes a part of a makhzan narrative of Hassan I’s executing his duty to defend the Muslim
community from exploitive infidels.
In addition to al-Nasiri, two Western observers documented the 1882 mahalla in a
travelogue called Moorish Loto Leaves. This account echoes many of the narrative details of alNasiri’s account, but places more of an emphasis on the militant aspect of the mahalla. The authors,
two English adventurers, George D. Cowan and R. L. N. Johnston, spoke Arabic and lived in
Essaouira where Johnston was at one point British vice consul.133 In 1882, while exploring Southern
Morocco, they briefly visited Hassan I’s troops who were in the midst of the mahalla. Unlike alNasiri, Cowan and Johnston write about the troops’ tendency to demand provisions of the regions
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they passed through and their willingness to use force to extract them. In one passage, they claim
“Not seldom, on arriving within a district where supplies have been withheld and other symptoms
of sulkiness exist, his majesty has ordered shells to be discharged, at midnight, in all directions;
thereby considerably astonishing and occasionally inconveniencing the natives.”134 By referencing
the refusal of tribes to render the expected supplies to royal forces, Cowan and Johnston undercut
the sultan’s claims to political authority from a particularly Western perspective. They contribute to
a narrative where the sultan lacks the ability to establish economic policy in this region in contrast
to the Western definition of sovereignty. The authors use of the term “sulkiness” is really an implicit
assertion that the sultan does not truly possess authority over these tribes. Simultaneously, their
stress on the resort to violent force reveals how Cowan and Johnston conceptualize sovereignty
within a Weberian definition where a monopoly on violence is at the core of state power. The
authors also talk about the mahalla as a means for the royal troops to supplement their pay through
pillage, writing “No wonder that, on such pay, the prospect of ‘eating up’ an unruly tribe should
immediately bring the battalions up to their full strength”135 and asserting that “subsequent wants
of his [a given qa’id’s] little regiment may be supplied from the legitimate ‘spoils of war,’ i.e., the
homesteads and matamoras of rebel clans.”136 This emphasis on pillage, sharply contrasts with alNasiri’s depiction of the mahalla as protective. Instead, Cowan and Johnston present the mahalla as
a predatory excursion in which force is used to extract wealth from violently resistant regions.
Again, this presentation challenges the notion that the sultan possessed authority over this area at
least according to the Western metric of sovereignty. If a state can wage war with a territory, that
territory is not yet a part of the state.

134

George D. Cowan and R. L. N. Johnston, Moorish Lotos Leaves: Glimpses of Southern Morocco (London: Tinsley
Brothers, 1883), 226.
135
Cowan and Johnston, 225.
136
Cowan and Johnston, 227.

47
Notably in the case of the 1882 mahalla, however, they mention the restraint of the sultan in
allowing the kind of looting they contend was typical of the mahalla. The following conversation
with a drillmaster in the sultan’s army returning from the expedition is particularly elucidating on
this front:
He [a drillmaster] went on to say:
“Thank God, this expedition is over! Since you were with us in Messah [Massa], the
Faithful have been dying more than a score a day. Rice was once at tenpence a pound… the
sultan would not let us fight, or we might have helped ourselves.”
“Had you no fighting then at all?”
“Only a trifle. We knocked down a few houses with cannon after the tribe had run away.
I’ll not lie to you. The Soos [Sous] people are too weak this year from famine to resist, and
they brought into camp all they had of what Cidna (our sovereign) wants.”137
This passage corroborates the lack of violence during the Sous campaign and swift capitulation of
the region to the demands of the sultan. Nevertheless, Cowan and Johnston are quick to undercut
the idea that this obedience is evidence of the Western notion of sovereignty by tying this lack of
resistance to an ongoing famine. By including this quote, they explain away the appearance of the
sultan’s control in the region by implying he would have been militarily challenged if not for
extenuating circumstances. At the same time, the comment of the drillmaster on the connection
between the lack of fighting and the malnourishment of the army also reinforces that the mahalla
more typically relied on pillaging as a means of sustaining itself.
With regard to the motivations for the mahalla, Cowan and Johnston are less charitable than
al-Nasiri, but they still name the threat of European trade as the immediate cause of the expedition.
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They begin by establishing “For more than seventy years the large trans-Atlasian provinces of Soos
[Sous], Ait Bou Amran [Ait Ba ’Amran], and Noon [Oued Noun] had been practically
independent.”138 The political nature of their characterization of the Sous is extremely explicit in
this passage. Through their labeling of the region as “practically independent,” they overtly reject
the legitimacy of the sultan’s claims over the region. By contextualizing this independence as
stretching back more than a generation, they assert a long-standing precedent for autonomy.
Furthermore they assert that the father of Husayn bin Hashim, whom they call the region’s most
powerful chief, actually renounced the authority of Hassan I’s predecessor Sultan Sliman in 1810.139
These details create a picture of the Sous as, at the least, an unwilling part of Morocco and, at the
most, a separate political entity that occasionally came into conflict with the ‘Alawite sultanate. As a
British vice-consul, Johnston in particular had a vested political interest in portraying this region as
beyond the boundaries of the sultan’s authority. Because of the sultan’s opposition to European
traders south of the port of Essouria, if Johnston could belie the sultan’s claim to the region, he
could legitimize, in Western eyes, the British attempts to open the economic relations with the
tribes of the Sous through local leaders like bin Hashim.
Like al-Nasiri, Cowan and Johnston mention the threat of the Sousi tribes opening their own
port. Although al-Nasiri claims this demand for a port was related to the implementation of the
Treaty of Tetouan, Cowan and Johnston disagree. Instead, they assert it would be the result of
negotiations between bin Hashim and the Europeans.140 They also imply a potentially vengeful
motivation, claiming that Hassan I, as a prince, had been humiliated by bin Hashim. In their telling,
when Hassan I arrived with a few hundred troops in the early 1870s bin Hashim had threatened
him, saying “’If you come in peace you will return to your place; should you cross the river [the
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Massa], upon your head be the consequence.’”141 Based on the correspondence analyzed in the
previous chapter, this anecdote seems to be untrue. In Cowan and Johnston’s narrative, only once
Hassan I arrived in the Sous and the Sousi tribes had paid him homage and presented him with
petitions explaining the difficulty of transporting trade goods to the port at Essaouira, did he
announce the opening of the port at Asaca.142 Thus, rather than depicting the mahalla as benevolent
attempt to protect the Sous from predatory European traders as in al-Nasiri’s telling, the account
presented in Moorish Lotos Leaves, portrays the expedition as an opportunistic attempt to subsume
the authority of the local leader of an independent region.
The American consular dispatches from the early 1880s also cover the 1882 mahalla to the
Sous. During the period being examined, the primary U.S. diplomat in Morocco was the consul at
the American Legation in Tangier, who would regularly compose missives to the American
secretary of state informing him of developments and happenings throughout the country. This
information was largely sourced through a network of local “protégés” who worked for the consul
in exchange for diplomatic immunity and other privileges.143 For the majority of Hassan I’s reign the
consul general was Felix A. Matthews, who was replaced in 1894 shortly before Hassan I’s death.
Born in Tangier, Matthews later immigrated to the U.S. from Spain where he served in the American
Civil War. After the war, in 1870, having achieved the rank of colonel, Matthews return to Morocco
as the American Consul General.144 Matthews had a unique insight into Morocco thanks to his
Arabic language abilities and his long association. Despite his distance from the events, his letters
provide a more detailed Western account than Cowan and Johnston’s book.
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Matthews, like the others, points to European trade with the Sousi tribes as the trigger for
the mahalla. Specifically, he names Donald Mackenzie’s establishment of a trading post at Cape Juby
or Tarfaya, a town at the southern edge of the Sous, under the auspices of the North West Africa
Company as the primary threat. According to Matthews’ letter on June 12, 1881, Hassan I “in April
and May 1880… [wrote] to the principal chieftain of the Wadnoon [Oued Noun] independent tribes
or semi republics requesting him to repulse all direct intercourse with Europeans… [promising] to
give the chief a sum of forty thousand dollars by compensation.”145 Matthews goes on to write that
the sultan failed to pay this sum and the chief – Husayn bin Hashim – returned to trading with the
Europeans.146 It is this breakdown in negotiations, rather than one al-Nasiri mentions about the
Treaty of Tetouan that Matthews references in his 1882 letter explaining the mahalla to the
American secretary of state.147 In this anecdote, Matthews, like Cowan and Johnston, contests the
notion of Hassan I’s sovereignty over the Sous. The sultan’s inability to control his own economic
policy without paying off local leaders, coupled with the depiction of the makhzan as too
economically impotent to even come up with the offered funds undercuts Hassan I’s claims to
political authority from a Western perspective. Matthews’ assertions are even less subtle than
Cowan and Johnston’s in their political nature, likely because his reports are explicitly diplomatic
documents. This naked politicism shown through his reference to the tribes of the Oued Noun as
“independent” and even as “semi-republics.” As an American diplomat speaking to an American
audience, Matthew’s use of “republic” is no accident. This claim of republicanism implicitly calls for
the United States to support these tribes as ideological bedfellows against the authoritarian
Moroccan state.

145

Felix A. Matthews, “Operations of the French in Wadnoon, West Coast of Africa,” Consular Dispatch (Tangier:
United States Consulate at Tangier, June 12, 1881), TALIM.
146
Matthews.
147
Felix A. Matthews, “Morocco Affairs,” Consular Dispatch (Tangier: United States Consulate at Tangier, June 29,
1882), TALIM.

51
In addition to punishing bin Hashim for illicit trade with the English at Cape Juby and
creating a competing port for Sousi produce, Matthews also explicitly states the goals of the mahalla
as “subjecting these tribes” and “to reduce these tribes to a fitting recognition of the claims of the
Imperial Treasury.”148 Through the use of the term “subjecting” Matthews asserts that these tribes
are not already subjects of the sultan. He furthermore suggests, like Cowan and Johnston, that the
mahalla may be in part a personal vendetta of Hassan I against bin Hashim over the sultan’s
humiliation while a prince. Above all, though, Matthews stresses the monetary nature of this
endeavor writing, “Nothing short of a heavy contribution to the treasury will dissuade… the
Emperor from attempting to chastise this formidable vassal.”149 By making the mahalla about
money along with his consistent (except in the above quotation) reference to the tribes as
“independent,” Matthews contributes to a narrative, contrary to al-Nasiri’s, that Hassan I is pillaging
rather than protecting. Matthew’s account aligns with his role as a Western political figure working
for a government sympathetic to, if not directly involved in, the imperial project in Africa. His
commentary portrays a petty, spiteful ruler whose fractured regime falls short of the Western
definition of sovereignty.
Despite their competing agendas, these sources collectively establish historical events
which show the ways Hassan I attempted to adapt the mahalla to make his political authority
legible to both Muslim and Western audiences. Aware of the importance of ensuring the European
imperial powers understood his authority, Hassan I used the mahalla to build economic and
military infrastructure. The incorporation of this task into the expedition was a departure from the
ways the mahalla had been used in the past, which had chiefly involved fighting and tax collection.
The creation of the port at Asaca served to reinforce makhzan control over trade and appealed to
Western notions that a sovereign state could set economic policy in its lands. The rebuilding of the
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base at Tiznit similarly supported Hassan I’s claim to a monopoly over force as required in the
Weberian conception of sovereignty, by discouraging armed rebellion. On the other hand, Hassan I’s
appointment of Islamic judges along with his receipt of oaths of loyalty from local religious elites
spoke directly to his political authority in the Islamic construction. As the decedent of the prophet, a
caliph, and the amir al-mu’minin, these aspects of the expedition, bolstered the religious pillars of
his claim to authority, by showing him to be pious and rightly guided.

Beating Back the British: The 1886 Return to the Sous
Despite the structures Hassan I put in place during the mahalla of 1882, trade between the
Sousi tribes and the Europeans outside of the legal channels persisted. In Tarfaya, the Bayruk family
of prominent Sousi caravanners continued to allow Donald MacKenzie and the British North West
Africa Company to operate a black-market port.150 With the new royal port in Asaca, Hassan I
refused to tolerate this continued illicit European trading presence in the southern territories and
set forth from Marrakesh in 1885, three years after his earlier expedition.151 On this mahalla, he
traveled further south than in 1882, reaching Guelmim and Tarfaya, itself. By 1886, the mahalla had
reached Tiznit, a major Sousi town, where the main army stayed while a smaller group continued
on to Oued Noun.152 They successfully evicted Donald Mackenzie and the British North West Africa
Company from their base at Cape Juby later that year.153 This removal of the European traders
shored up ‘Alawite supremacy in the region. Unlike the mahalla of 1882, this smaller expedition did
not draw the attention of European travelers or the American consul. Al-Nasiri, on the other hand
does dedicate a few pages to it and in doing so once more attempts to assert the sultan’s Islamic
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political authority over the region by portraying him as the consummate amir al-mu’minin. While
the change in framing demonstrates more clearly how the presence of British traders tested the
bonds between the makhzan and the Sous, it also shows how Hassan I continued to respond in ways
that would make his authority legible to both European and Moroccan observers.
According to al-Nasiri, the mahalla began when Hassan I left Marrakesh for the Sous on the
27th of March 1885.154 The sultan had “heard of the tumult of the subjects in those lands and the
expulsion of their governor and that some English traders had erected a port on those coasts called
Tarfaya, intent on selling and buying with some of the tribes” and so he “rose to put an end to the
source of this corruption.”155 Once again, al-Nasiri portrays Hassan I in the defense of the Islamic
community, protecting Muslims from the corruption (fasad) of the Christian traders. This defense of
the community was directly tied to Hassan I’s responsibility as an Islamic ruler, so al-Nasiri’s
account of 1886 mahalla clearly contributes to his narrative of the sultan’s political authority over
the Sous. As in his account of the 1882 mahalla, al-Nasiri focuses a great deal on how the local tribes
received the sultan. He writes that Hassan I was met by “rallies of their masses accompanied by
their notables and those considered among their experts in Islamic jurisprudence (fuqaha) and
their sharifs and their marabouts.”156 The large and joyous greeting, especially by experts in Islamic
law and those invested with baraka, buttresses al-Nasiri’s implicit assertion that Hassan I is the
rightful ruler of these lands. One section in particular makes clear this emphasis, when al-Nasiri,
describes the sultan’s welcome at Guelmim on the thirteenth of May, 1886, stating “there the sheiks
of the Arabs of the M’aqil and their submissive and compliant elders rejoiced at the presentation of
the sultan.”157 Al-Nasiri’s choice to describe the elders as submissive (khad’in) and compliant
(muti’in) obviously furthers his narrative that these territories are firmly loyal to Hassan I.
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Beyond the engagement with the tribes, al-Nasiri also briefly treats the encounter between
the sultan and the English at Cape Juby, stating that the sultan took “a battalion of his army to the
port at Tarfaya … to those traders of the English there, and… those of the Nazerenes [Christians]
who were there ran to their boats which were upon that coast.”158 Al-Nasiri makes explicit his
attempt to tie this mahalla to the ideals of Islamic political authority in his use of the term
“Nazerene.” By drawing attention to the religion of the traders rather than referring to them as
Englishmen, as he does elsewhere in the chronicle, al-Nasiri places their interaction with Hassan I
in the context of the sultan’s role as the protector of Islamic lands. By describing Christians fleeing
before the might of the amir al-mu’minin, al-Nasiri would have been reassuring his Muslim readers
that Hassan I was a true ruler capable of fulfilling his protective duties as caliph.
As in the accounts from the 1882 mahalla, the basic historical details of the 1886 mahalla
show how Hassan I used this expedition to try to reinforce both Islamic and Western
understandings of his political authority in the region. The crackdown on illicit trading was a clear
response to the failure of the reforms from the 1882 mahalla. Hassan I understood that without
control of trade, he would not be taken seriously by the European powers. As a result, this second
expedition culminated in the physical removal the British competition to the makhzan’s new port.
Furthermore, Hassan I’s ability to not once, but twice bring an army through the Sous without
military contestation from the local tribes would have demonstrated the makhkzan’s monopoly on
power in the region was not simply a result of the famine during the previous expedition. In
addition to these techniques for appealing to Western definitions of sovereignty, as al-Nasiri shows,
Hassan I deftly used traditions to signal his authority to Muslim audiences. His reception of the
bay’a along with his successful military expulsion of Christians from Tarfaya (even if they were
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merely traders and not an army) directly spoke to the sources of his right to command in the
Islamic context.

The Last Great Journey: The Mahalla to Tafilalt in 1892
The last of Hassan I’s great expeditions was to Tafilalt from 1892 to 1893, as he died on
campaign in 1894, shortly after his return.159 During the final years of his reign, Hassan I feared that
Europeans would cite tribal unrest as demonstrative of his lack of sovereignty and as grounds for
imperial occupation as had occurred in Tunisia in 1881.160 As a result, when tribal discontent began
to stir on the edge of Morocco’s border with Algeria, Hassan I departed with 15-30,000 troops in
order to restore stability in the region.161 Like the Sous, Tafilalt was a region on the boundaries of
the state that was facing increasing European pressure, in this case from the French in colonized
Algeria. Tafilalt also held a great deal of personal and religious significance for Hassan I as the place
from which the ‘Alawite dynasty emerged in the mid-seventeenth century to take control of
Morocco and the site of his ancestors’ graves. 162 On this mahalla, Hassan I took a rather circuitous
path to Tafilalt, marching in a large arc from Fez to Tafilalt and back to Marrakesh, crisscrossing the
Atlas mountains.163 As in the mahallas to the Sous, little fighting was involved, the focus being on
the collection of taxes and oaths of loyalty.164
Al-Nasiri’s description of the expedition to Tafilalt is the longest of his three mahalla
accounts. The majority of this section, however, consists of a letter to the governors of Morocco
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ostensibly from the sultan, himself. 165 Through his framing of the narrative, Hassan I addresses
questions of his authority over the region, defending it against both domestic and international
objections by focusing on his reception by the various tribes he encountered en route, emphasizing
their loyalty, joy at seeing him, and military support.
Hassan I’s descriptions of the journey and, in particular, the couching of his interactions
with the mountain tribes serve to reinforce his claims to political authority by shoring up the bases
of his legitimacy. Early in his narrative Hassan I suggests the difficulty of the trip, writing “it was
difficult of advance… so we relaxed, God exalted, and we trusted entirely in him [God] and we
delegated the thing entirely to him.”166 Despite conceding that the success of his expedition was not
given, this line reinforces the image of Hassan I’s piety and role as a chosen one of God. By depicting
himself in this light, Hassan I reminds his Muslim audience of the religious basis of his authority in
the Islamic context. Notwithstanding this early concession about the potential difficulties of the trip,
Hassan I spends most of the letter relating the tribes’ loyalty, contesting the narrative that these
regions were beyond the limits of his political authority. In a passage speaking about two of these
groups, he states “we traversed the lands of the Ait Yusi repeatedly, and we crossed the lands of the
Beni Mguild, and we found them all driven to obedience, completely docile.”167 This emphasis on
the tribes’ passivity is a means of asserting his dominance over them and establishing that those
territories were firmly a part of his state. Highlighting their passivity, Hassan I describes these
tribes’ obedience in a way that responds to the frequent European characterization of the Atlas
tribes as unruly and beyond the reach of the makhzan.
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Even when he relates an encounter with an unfriendly tribe, Hassan I does so in a fashion
that shores up his legitimacy as their rightful leader. This strategy is made clear in the description
of his interaction with the Ait Azdig:
“the flags of delusion and temptation rolled up from them, and we met with the chiefs of their
lands, afraid… and scared of the power of God. We dispensed forgiveness altruistically… and
abandoning killing due to the youths and elderly and sheiks and weak... treating with
forgiveness those among them who were lost and astray and taking the words of the Almighty:
‘Verily forgiving is closest to being strong.’”168
Two primary themes immerge from this passage corresponding to the two definitions of political
authority Hassan I was attempting to satisfy. First, Hassan I presents his army as unchallengeable.
This idea is reinforced by the fear of the chiefs and Hassan I’s comment that he chose not to kill
them. By emphasizing the supremacy of his military, Hassan I speaks implicitly to the Weberian
construction. Second, Hassan I casts the entire encounter in a religious light. His reference to the
Quran, the centrality of forgiveness, and his label of the tribe as deluded and astray, all shift this
interaction from one of political-military conflict to one of a religious leader guiding his lost flock.
Thus, Hassan I establishes his authority over the region within the Islamic conception in spite of the
tribe’s opposition. The deft framing of this encounter is a prime example of the way in which
Hassan I attempted to speak to two distinct audiences.
Later in the letter, Hassan I describes the jubilant reception that awaited him upon his
arrival at Tafilalt. He writes: “all the sharifs and the public met us, men and women and our youth
and the elderly and middle-aged flocking in crowds and individually and in pairs and creating great
congestion in our vision, and they were filled with joy and delight at our presentation.”169 This

168
169

al-Nasiri, 8:215.
al-Nasiri, 8:216.

58
depiction of overwhelming enthusiasm upon the sultan’s arrival again seeks to establish the loyalty
of these far-off regions. Especially in the dynasty’s hometown, this kind of reaction was critical for
indicating the continued loyalty of the people and their acknowledgement of his authority over
them. As in al-Nasiri’s accounts of the mahallas to the Sous, this passage highlights the role of the
sharifs in welcoming the sultan. The choice to include this detail, reinforces the narrative of Hassan
I’s Islamic authority by investing him with the accumulated gravitas of the local religious elite.
Hassan I’s depiction of his journey contrasts sharply with the report American consul Felix
A. Matthews sent to the Secretary of State about the expedition. Matthews only dedicates a single
letter to the mahalla to Tafilalt, as he was more preoccupied at the time with an uprising in the Rif
against the Spanish in Melilla. Nonetheless, his account challenges Hassan I’s narrative of docile
tribes and grand welcomes.170 According to Matthews’ letter on October 15, 1883, “the Emperor
[Hassan I] with his Army of about twenty thousand men were surrounded and cut off by the warlike
Tribes of the Atlas Mountains.”171 This line alone tells a very different story. “Surrounded and cut
off” makes clear a high degree of animosity toward the makhzan forces from at least some of the
Atlas tribes. Additionally, this passage contests Hassan I’s sovereignty by undercutting the idea of
makhzan’s monopoly over violent force. If the tribes of the Atlas could successfully wield enough
military power to cut off the sultan’s expedition, he was hardly sovereign over them. Matthews goes
onto to write that “he [Hassan I] may return to his capital foregoing his visit to Tafilet [Tafilalt],
where his power is hardly nominal.”172 Historically, Hassan I did in fact continue to Tafilalt, casting
some doubt on the quality of Matthews’ sources. Nevertheless, Matthews puts forward the
narrative that a possible early return due to the resistance of the tribes was at least plausible.
Furthermore, he explicitly attacks the sultan’s claims to authority over Tafilalt, calling his power
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“nominal.” In spite of Hassan I’s claims to Tafilalt, if he could not exert economic and military
control over the region, in Matthews’ mind that authority was purely imagined. This assertion that
the sultan’s power was almost non-existent in this region also feeds into the European narrative of
the Tafilalt region’s de facto independence.
While Matthews acknowledges the familial importance of Tafilalt to the ‘Alawites as “the
birth-place of their [the ‘Alawites] sovereign powers called Bilad-Sherfa, “Country of the Shereefs
[Sharifs],” he writes that “The Emperors never visit Tafilet [Tafilalt] except as dethroned exiles.”173
This statement also reinforces the idea that Tafilalt was peripheral to the state to the extent that it
would be an acceptable place of exile. Such peripheralizing suggests Matthews is trying to support
his ongoing narrative of Tafilalt as beyond the power of the sultan and the impression of weak
governance in spite of evidence to the contrary.
Walter B. Harris provides further details of the sultan’s stay at Tafilalt in his travelogue
entitled Tafilet: The Narrative Journey of Exploration in the Atlas Mountains and the Oases of the
North-West Sahara. Harris was an English adventurer and an accomplished linguist, fluent in
French, Spanish, and Arabic, including the Moroccan dialect. Though born and raised in London, at
the age of eighteen Harris moved to Morocco, remaining there as a reporter for The Times for the
better part of forty years.174 Often disguising himself as a sharif, he reveled in travelling to parts of
the country that were off limits to Christians.175 In 1893, hearing of Hassan I’s visit to Tafilalt, he set
off – without invite – to see the territory.176 Ultimately, Harris reached the camp of the mahalla at
Tafilalt, gravely ill, and stayed several days there as an unwanted guest.177 Harris’ firsthand account
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describes in vivid detail the sultan’s camp and touches on Hassan I’s interactions with the local
tribes during his stay, noting his attempts at mediation and influence of the tribes over him.
Harris contradicts Matthew’s tale of a sultan trapped by hostile tribes in the mountains.
Instead, he claims that “although… no opposition was put to his progress, he must necessarily have
been during the whole expedition in a state of great anxiety.”178 While Harris’s statement refutes
the idea of any actual opposition to the sultan’s journey, he does allow for the possibility, suggesting
that advanced bribery of the tribes along the route was the source of his safe passage.179 Though he
does not go as far as Matthews in asserting a contestation of the sultan’s military supremacy, Harris
still casts doubt on Hassan I’s monopoly over violent force and thus over his sovereignty in the
Western conception. As the only writer not in an explicitly political position, Harris’ depiction of the
mahalla in such a way that cast aspersions on the sultan’s sovereignty shows how even civilian
accounts from the period are imbued with a fundamentally political narrative.
Harris also provides us with a sense of the sultan’s interactions with the tribes of the area.
In one particular anecdote, he relates:
At the time of my stay in the Sultan’s camp a skirmish took place between the two [the Ahl
Subah and the Amazigh] in the very presence of Mulai el Hassen [Hassan I], several on both
sides being killed, altogether some fifteen it is said. The Sultan promptly imprisoned the
ringleaders of each party; but such force was brought to bear upon him by the prisoners’
fellow-tribesmen that he was obliged to release them in the course of a few days.180
This incident defines Hassan I’s relationship to tribes in two important ways. While Harris does
allow that Hassan I is an arbiter of justice as seen through his imprisonment of the two leaders, he
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still undermines the idea of his sovereignty. By claiming that even in the midst of his army, the
tribes had enough authority to force Hassan I to undo his act of justice, Harris depicts the sultan’s
fear of the tribes, thus implicitly contesting his monopoly over force. In spite of the sultan’s great
authority as a judge, Harris ultimately asserts that Hassan I’s power depended on the acquiescence
of the tribes, and therefore did not meet the Western standards of sovereignty.

Conclusion
These descriptions of the 1882 and 1886 mahallas to the Sous and the 1892-1893 mahalla
to Tafilalt demonstrate the ways in which diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic documents formed a
space of narrative contestation over Hassan I’s political authority in southern borderlands of
Morocco at the end of the nineteenth century. In other words, these accounts are fundamentally
political attempts to define the relationship between the sultan and the Moroccan periphery in the
context of European economic imperialism. Through a diverse array of primary sources from
different and competing perspectives, we are able to see how Western and Moroccan observers
used their narratives of these events to advance certain political agendas. In addition, these
documents show how the authors applied different definitions of political authority to this question
and articulated implicit arguments that would have been legible to their respective audiences.
While al-Nasiri contributes to a royal narrative of the sultan’s rightful authority over these
territories, he does so primarily in a way that would be understandable in an Islamic, rather than
Western context. Matthews, Harris, and Cowan and Johnston, on the other hand, mostly contest the
sultan’s claims to political authority and do so by asserting that he does not meet the Western
definition of sovereignty based on economic control and a monopoly on force. With the exception of
Harris, these men are official agents of their respective governments and all their accounts reflect
attempts to construct narratives of the relationship between the sultan and southern Morocco that
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facilitate their political agendas. Ultimately, these documents are performative speech acts with
repercussions for the externalized basis of Hassan I’s political authority, so through these
competing narratives, the authors are actually constructing or attacking makhzan authority, itself.
In addition to revealing the role of diplomatic documents in constructing political authority
and differing definitions used in doing so, these accounts show how Hassan I attempted to make his
authority legible to both domestic challengers and Western observers. Faced with increased
European intrusion at the end of the nineteenth century, Hassan I set about consolidating his
domestic power and adapted traditional political tools such as the mahalla to shore up his authority
in the eyes of new audiences. Rather than violent military conquests the bulk of these mahallas
were a kind of political theater intended to make makhzan power legible on the boundaries of the
state. The sultan appointed judges and governors, collected of oaths of loyalty, and held physical
audiences with subjects and notables, all of which supported his claims to political authority in the
Islamic conception. He understood that his physical presence, particularly due to his personal
religious significance and baraka allowed him to exert greater influence over these regions, from
which he was normally far removed. For that reason, these expeditions included numerous
opportunities for the sultan to be seen and for the local religious elites to pay him homage. They
also highlighted his ability to defend the Islamic community from Christian incursion. However, the
changing dynamics of the late nineteenth century, particularly the increased presence of
Europeans, required him to appeal to more than just Islamic ideas of political authority. Through
the successful completion of long military campaigns to the edges of his state, Hassan I tried to
show the monopoly of the makhzan over violent force, appealing to the Western conception of
sovereignty in the Weberian framework. Additionally, through the construction of a new port, the
removal of European competitors, and the repeated reprimand of tribes that engaged in blackmarket trade, Hassan I tried to shore up his control over the economy. In accomplishing the goals of
making his political authority legible to two different audiences, the reformation of the mahalla
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formed a crucial part of Hassan I’s arsenal of policies. It allowed him to practice his authority in a
way that simultaneously addressed both domestic and foreign challenges.
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Chapter III
The Tourmaline Incident and British Informal Empire
Introduction
Following the mahallas of the 1880s, contestation of the makhzan’s authority over the Sous
quieted for a few years. Both Hassan I’s efforts to change the kind of domestic political authority he
practiced in the region and his simultaneous attempts to establish an externalized basis for his
authority seem to have been at least temporarily successful. The latter efforts culminated in the
1895 Anglo-Moroccan Treaty signed just after his death. This treaty negotiated the Moroccan buyout of Mackenzie’s problematic trading outpost in exchange for British recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty as far south as the 26th parallel to what is now Boujdour in the Western Sahara.181 In
1897, however, three years into the reign of Ba Ahmad, the regent for Hassan I’s son ‘Abd al-‘Aziz,
the question was raised to the international stage once more during a series of events that came to
be known as the Tourmaline Incident. A diplomatic debacle between the British Empire and the
Moroccan Sultanate, the affair involved a number of British citizens acting in a private capacity who
internationalized a Sousi claim of independence during an attempt to reopen trade with the region.
Though ultimately a failure, this endeavor provides us with an excellent opportunity to
examine the role of the phenomenon of British informal empire and the imperialism of free trade,
as theorized by Robinson and Gallagher, in stoking the sovereignty crisis in southern Morocco. In
particular, this incident is notable as it generated both an enormous amount of coverage in
newspapers and diplomatic circles as well as two popular accounts written by the leader and
another member of the expedition. Though the venture was formally condemned by the British
government, and the authors were actually tried in English courts for their crimes against Morocco,
the popular presentation of the events through the published, personal accounts had lasting
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ramifications on perceptions of the relationship between the southern tribes and the Moroccan
state. Additionally, through examining the presentation of makhzani sovereignty in these accounts,
we are able to see how non-official narratives engaged in the same documentary contestation as
official accounts, and so also contribute to the construction of externally based forms of political
authority.

The Foreign Office and the Agents of Informal Empire
The story of the Tourmaline incident begins in May of 1896 with an Austrian conman
pretending to be a Moroccan royal physician named Abdul Kerim Bey.182 Kerim Bey, whose real
name was Gehling, claimed to hold a concession for a trading monopoly in the Sous that he
managed to sell to the Globe Venture Syndicate in London.183 The board of this corporation
included multiple former ambassadors and notable figures in international commerce, directly
linking the Syndicate with the world of British foreign affairs.184 This connection of a private
company established to trade on the periphery of a foreign state to the political sphere immediately
placed the Syndicate in the larger context of the British firms that Cain and Hopkins identify as the
agents of informal empire.185 Given the influential men involved in the project, the company might
reasonably expect there was a chance of the British military bailing them out if anything went awry.
From the very beginning of the endeavor, however, the Foreign Office was suspicious of the
corporation’s activities. The concession the company claimed to hold purportedly granted the
holder exclusive import and mining rights in Oued Noun as well as the ability to acquire
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property.186 The company further alleged the concession had been granted by “the council of the
chiefs of all the independent tribes of the Suss [Sous]”, rather than the sultan, though it did allegedly
have his approval.187 Neither of these claims sat right with Arthur Nicolson, at that time the British
Minister in Tangier and the primary British diplomat in Morocco. He believed the sultan was
unlikely to have approved such an action, which was contrary to the continued policy of prohibiting
European trade with the Sous.188 Nicolson’s suspicions and the reticence of the Foreign Office to
support the Globe Venture Syndicate in this case is indicative of what Robinson and Gallagher argue
was the reluctant nature of British formal empire more generally.189 If we assume their framework
for the purpose of analyzing this incident, we see that in Morocco the British government would
have had no interest in establishing a colony or otherwise annexing the country.190 The British
already dominated foreign trade and had close ties to a strong, well established central
government, so it would not suit British interests to create internal tension or to invoke the ire of
other European powers which might upset that balance. This argument is supported by the Office’s
continued application of the 1895 Anglo-Moroccan Treaty throughout the affair. As a result, rather
than acting as an extension of official British foreign policy, the Syndicate’s expedition dragged the
Foreign Office into a conflict over sovereignty it had previously resolved.
The suspicions of the Foreign Office were confirmed by a letter from the Grand Vizier and
regent, Ba Ahmad on the 20th of December which, in the official consular translation, stated that
“this region [Oued Noun] and its inhabitants are at the disposal and under the protection
and guardianship of the Government – God exalt it – and that none of these inhabitants have
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the power to make any agreement with any of the merchants about anything of this or even
speak of it… a warning is given to whoever entangles himself and goes there, that his life
and the consequences rest with himself.”191
The Moroccan government was not the only group upset by these assertions. The news of
the Syndicate caused a significant stir in Spain which had claims to certain territories in southern
Morocco as part of the 1860 Treaty of Tetouan. In February of 1897, the following ran in El Pais, a
republican paper in Madrid: “If this Syndicate realizes its projects it will do so by ignoring the
sovereignty of the Sultan in the Suss [Sous] territory, by establishing the autonomy of the Chiefs
and tribes against the hegemony of a State recognized by all Powers; by altering the Status Quo of
Morocco; by modifying the boundaries of its territory; by contemptuously ignoring our rights under
the Treaty of Tetuan [sic].” 192 Here we see both that the makhzan’s claims to the Sous were now
internationally accepted and that it was the actions of a British company that were again throwing
that sovereignty into question for European powers.
Based on the warnings of the Foreign Office that they would receive no support unless they
obtained the consent of the sultan, in late February 1897, the Syndicate sent Major Arthur Gibbon
Spilsbury of the Militia Division Royal Engineers to accompany Kerim Bey to the royal court in
Marrakesh.193 By March 20th, the pair had arrived in Tangier where they met with Arthur
Nicolson.194 During this meeting, Nicolson conveyed the stance of the sultan and the threats of Ba
Ahmad to seize the merchandise of and arrest any Europeans who landed in the Sous.195 In this
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interaction we see that Nicolson had no interest in helping Spilsbury press the company’s dubious
claim. Any imperial impulse to override the sultan’s authority came from the corporation and not
from the government officials.
In spite of these warnings, Spilsbury insisted on continuing to Marrakesh, while claiming
that the Sousi chiefs were independent from the sultan.196 From Tangier, the pair traveled to
Marrakesh where Spilsbury received an audience with Ba Ahmad who repudiated beyond a shadow
of a doubt the legitimacy of the concession that Kerim Bey claimed to hold.197 Following the regent’s
refusal to consider any other proposals allowing the Globe Venture Syndicate to trade in the Sous
and his prohibition of Spilsbury’s visiting the region, the major departed Marrakesh for Essaouira.
Upon arriving in Essaouira, Spilsbury met with British Vice Consul R. L. N Johnston who
warned him against crossing the Atlas Mountains into the Sous upon the request of Robert
Gascoyne-Cecil, the Marquess of Salisbury and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.198
This warning further establishes opposition to the venture as part of the broader policy of the
Foreign Office and not just the stance of Nicolson personally. It also falls in line with Robinson and
Gallagher’s claim that Salisbury was “infuriated by the ‘superficial philanthropy’ and ‘roguery’ of the
‘fanatics’ who advocated expansion.”199 Salisbury’s opposition to men like Spilsbury who as agents
of informal empire dragged Britain into new overseas conflicts demonstrates the division between
British policy and the actions of independent corporations like the Globe Venture Syndicate in the
expansion of the empire.
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After his meeting with Vice Consul Johnston, Major Spilsbury met two men who he claimed
told him they spoke on behalf of Husayn bin Hashim.200 In reality, they represented bin Hashim’s
son Muhammad as Husayn had died eleven years before.201 After corresponding with Muhammad
about the terms, on July 2 these three men signed a treaty, attested to by Vice Consul Johnston,
granting Major Spilsbury exclusive trading rights in the Sous at the ports of Asaca and Arksis.202
Having acquired this contract, Spilsbury violated the orders of the Foreign Office by traveling to
Arksis where he met again with the two men from Essaouira as well as other tribal leaders, though
not bin Hashim, and promised to return with goods for trade, in particular, rifles and
ammunition.203 In this encounter Spilsbury conforms to Cain and Hopkin’s model of an agent of
informal empire. He engaged in trade of a dubious nature on the periphery of a state in the British
zone of influence against the wishes of the Foreign Office and promised to provide arms to a group
that was planning to revolt, setting the stage for the kind of incident that might trigger imperial
intervention. 204
The underlying threat of rebellion as recognized by both Moroccan and British officials
demonstrates that Sousi leaders were not mere passive participants in the expansion of informal
British empire, but rather attempted to exploit agents like Spilsbury to further their own agendas.
In particular, Muhammad bin Hashim believed that the British government would ultimately back
the Syndicate in the event of an incident as it had done with other companies elsewhere on the
continent. 205 This assumption shows his underlying awareness of the mechanisms of informal
British empire and his willingness to utilize imperial power as leverage within a domestic economic
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dispute. Muhammad’s involvement in this whole affair adds an interesting aspect as well. Here was
the man who a decade prior had been the close confident of the sultan and the super governor of
the Sous, but now, rather than promoting makhzan authority, he was actively contesting the
Moroccan claim over the Sous in order to trade with a British company in the exact same way his
Bayruk relatives had a generation prior. In both cases, first with MacKenzie and then with
Spilsbury, it was the arrival of a British merchant company that provided to the spark to challenge
the sultan’s authority.
In spite of the growing tension and warnings of the Foreign Office that they would not
support or protect him in the endeavor, Spilsbury continued in his mission. He arrived back in
England on August 5th where he met with the directors of the Globe Venture Syndicate. Together
they decided to press their claims on the basis of Spilsbury’s new contract despite the opposition of
the sultan and the Foreign Office and without informing their investors of the change or the
fraudulent nature of the original concession.206 The chairman, himself a member of the Foreign
Office, opposed the trade of ammunitions, so the board approved the measure in his absence. 207
The necessity of hiding this act from the chairman of the board again highlights the disconnect
between official agents of British policy and the agents of informal empire such as Spilsbury, who
were much more gung-ho about foreign interventionism.
After this meeting, Spilsbury assembled a crew and purchased a steamboat, the Tourmaline,
before sailing to Antwerp where he acquired 3,650 Mannlicher rifles and 500,000 rounds of
ammunition, lying to customs officials by saying variously that he was returning to England or was
passing the winter in the Canary Islands.208 Instead, from Belgium, the Tourmaline headed to
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Arksis.209 Spilsbury’s lies about his destination suggest he had clear knowledge of the illegality of
his venture from the outset and believed he would be stopped by official authorities had his true
intent been known. This attitude places Spilsbury and the Globe Venture Syndicate in the category
identified by Cain and Hopkins of the British “rejuvenators of empire” in the late nineteenth century
whose “willingness to cut corners on the frontiers of empire was often frowned on in London.”210 In
this way, the events around the Tourmaline incident were indicative of a larger phenomenon
throughout the periphery of the “informal empire.”
When the Tourmaline arrived, many members of the Ait Arbain, or Amazigh war council,
with which Spilsbury had been dealing were present, but bin Hashim remained absent, so Spilsbury
determined to wait before unloading all of the rifles.211 After a few days, however, the Moroccan
royal steamship the Hassani arrived to arrest the crew of the Tourmaline and bring them back to
Essaouira, as per the threats of Ba Ahmad. After signaling the Tourmaline to stop, the Hassani
lowered three boats of soldiers into the water to prevent the Tourmaline from picking up the crew
on shore and escaping. In response, the Spilsbury signaled that he would fire on the Hassani if it did
not leave. He then demonstrated the seriousness of his threat by shooting rifles and the
Tourmaline’s deck cannon across the bow of the Hassani. Spilsbury’s aggressive attitude toward the
Moroccan flagship and his willingness to escalate the situation demonstrates a proclivity to start a
violent confrontation with local authorities. Had such an incident occurred in Morocco, as it did in
other instances of the provocation of agents of informal empire, it might have forced the hand of the
British government causing them to intervene militarily in the pattern Robinson and Gallagher
identified in other parts of Africa.
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Instead, in this instance, Spilsbury returned to Essaouria and eventually to London without
further incident following the arrest of five of his crew members who had remained on shore
during the negotiations with the tribal leaders. The five men in question were taken to Essaouira
after several weeks and delivered to the governor, Haj ‘Ali bin al-Haj, who then transferred them to
British consular custody.212 The primary cause of this delay was the sultan’s insistence that the
British government pledge to properly punish the Globe Venture Syndicate and the crew of the
Tourmaline for what he viewed as an attempt to incite rebellion and cause the Sous to secede.213
The prisoners were finally delivered to the British consulate in Tangier on April 29th, 1898, only
after the issuing of a warrant for the arrest of Major Spilsbury and lengthy negotiations between the
British and Moroccan governments over the repercussions he and the other members of the
Syndicate would face.214
While one of the men was a German national who was promptly released by the German
authorities, the other four men were tried in British consular court for gun running. Two of the men
who were more involved with the Syndicate were sentenced to four months of imprisonment, while
the others who were hired sailors received three weeks under the assumption that they were not
aware of the illegal nature of the expedition when they signed onto the Tourmaline’s crew. 215 In
this case, we see a willingness on the part of the Foreign Office to press charges and penalize British
citizens who violated the laws of foreign nations in the pursuit of trade. This attitude stands in
contrast to the German response toward their citizen who was involved in the same incident and
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demonstrates the connection between this case and the broader conflict between the Foreign Office
and agents of informal empire.
The British government applied this same animosity toward Major Spilsbury when he
arrived back in London. In swift order he was kicked out of the army, found that the directors of the
Syndicate claimed complete ignorance of his dealing in arms, and then on July 1st was arrested
under the warrant issued by Nicolson.216 His trial began on August 5th when he was tried before the
Supreme Court of Gibraltar for “on the coast of the Sous in the territorial waters of the Empire of
Morocco unlawfully and riotously assembl[ing] and riotously mak[ing] an assault upon certain
soldiers of the Sultan of Morocco by firing on the Sultan’s ship named the ‘Hassanie’ [Hassani].”217
Because he was tried under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, however, there was no jury at his initial
trial. Due to this lack of a jury trial, he appealed his case to the Privy Counsel and was granted
another trial this time by a jury comprised of residents of Gibraltar, which swiftly acquitted him of
any wrongdoing on April 20th, 1899.218 The Globe Venture Syndicate, on the other hand, was found
guilty in a separate case of defrauding its investors and ordered to be wound up.219
The press and droves of sympathetic British citizens closely followed Spilsbury’s exploits
and especially his trial. His attempt to smuggle arms was favorably compared to the Jameson Raid
against the Transvaal as a similarly unsuccessful attempt to spread British influence. He was
furthermore applauded for his demand of a jury trial, while the Foreign Office was condemned as
weak for trying to abrogate the rights of a British citizen in favor of an “eastern” power.220
Following the trial, the general opinion on Gibraltar was that the Sous was not a part of Morocco.221
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Despite the clear and consistent opposition of the British Government, the narrative about
Moroccan sovereignty forwarded by Spilsbury during his trial proved immensely popular both in
Britain and abroad.
The Tourmaline expedition was a series of events fundamentally opposed to the British
political agenda in Morocco at the time. Rather than complementing official British policy, or being
tacitly supported by government officials, the affair occurred in spite of their explicit and repeated
attempts to prevent it. Following the 1895 Anglo-Moroccan Agreement, intended in part to clarify
lingering land disputes over Cape Juby and to counter French incursions in the Sahara, the British
government affirmed and recognized the sovereignty of the Moroccan sultan well south of the
Sous.222 This recognition was not merely lip service either, in addition to their opposition to the
Globe Venture Syndicate’s foray in the region, during the period from 1896 to 1899, the Foreign
Office successfully discouraged two other English companies from pursuing trading concessions in
southern Morocco without explicit permission from the sultan.223 This break between Spilsbury and
the Foreign Office is indicative of the mechanisms of informal empire that dragged British
governments deeper into the colonial project during this period. Spilsbury’s case in particular is
interesting as it highlights the influence of such endeavors over British public perception of
international issues of sovereignty even in the case of failure. Further, it demonstrates how local
elites like Muhammad bin Hashim attempted to exploit these mechanisms of empire. The presence
of corporate enterprises like the Globe Venture Syndicate that were byproducts of this imperial
phenomenon presented opportunities for such regional leaders to gain an advantage in domestic
power struggles. Thus, we can see that the particular phenomenon of British informal empire was a
key element in the new pressures on the relationship between the sultan and the tribes of southern
Morocco that led to the crises of sovereignty in the Sous at the end of the nineteenth century.
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Popular Accounts in the Construction of Sovereignty
As a result of their role as informal agents of empire, who acted in opposition to their
government, the members of the Tourmaline expedition attempted to construct Moroccan
sovereignty from a radically different position than the authors analyzed in the previous chapters.
Rather than working hand in glove with the political agenda of their country, their narratives are
fundamentally anti-diplomatic documents. As a result, Spilsbury and Grey’s popularly published
accounts show how non-official documents, even those that work against political authorities, still
participate and are in fact highly influential in the process of the narrative construction of
sovereignty and other types of political authority.

Spilsbury’s Account
Capitalizing on the celebrity generated by his trial and the media coverage of the
Tourmaline Incident, in 1906 Spilsbury published his official account of the affair. Entitled The
Tourmaline Expedition, the book was published with a five chapter appendix by W. R. Stewart, a
former member of the Niger Company, calling for the colonization of “Southwest Barbary.” Over the
course of 225 pages, Spilsbury lays out his version of the events, presenting them in such a way as
to assert his complete innocence. A critical part of his argument is that the sultan of Morocco had no
legitimate claim to the Sous and was not recognized by the tribes therein. If this were the case, then
it would follow, in his logic, that he not only had every right to trade in the region, but also to
defend himself from the illegal disruption of that trade by a foreign power. The book is also a
stinging criticism of the Foreign Office and the Moroccan government by a man who felt wronged
by both. Throughout his account, Spilsbury stresses his perception of the independence of the Sous
while trying to make the sultan out to be a poor and vindictive ruler without any control over the
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lands he claimed. The structure of this argument mirrors the implicit assumptions found in the
other European accounts of the Sous from nearly fifteen years earlier.
The first part of Spilsbury’s narrative consists of a general description of Morocco and the
towns and regions through which he passed on the way to Marrakesh. In this section he uses the
opportunity to portray Morocco as an impoverished, dangerous place largely due to the misrule of
the sultan. He describes the royal city of Meknes as surrounded by “piles of rotting manure, with
dust and rubbish, decomposing carcases [sic] of camels, donkeys and dogs every conceivable refuse
in huge heaps.”224 He also critiques the country’s infrastructure claiming “Bridges are an unknown
luxury, and I only met with half-a-dozen in the immediate vicinity of the towns; most of these were
ruinous, and no attempts were made to keep them in repair.”225 These two quotations are merely
representative, but by highlighting squalor and portraying the disrepair of road systems, Spilsbury
taps into the narratives of “backwardsness” and “primitiveness” used to justify European
colonialism throughout the continent. If the sultan was unable to maintain his country, the
implication was that he was unfit to rule it. This idea is further developed through Spilsbury’s
emphasis on the inability of the mazkhan to secure the roads and countryside. In one passage he
states that “outside all Moorish towns there is no security for life or property after dark.”226 As in
the other passages this line is an indirect condemnation of the sultan’s governance, and through
that critique, his right to rule. He explicitly uses this idea to develop the notion of the sultan’s
supposed weakness. In an extended passage about the Beni Zemur he describes them as “the
dreaded Zemmuri, who are no respecters of our lord the Sultan, tempted by the rich prizes being
led by their very doors, rush out from their wild haunts, and raid the sacred property of their
master.”227 In addition to declaring their lack of respect for their supposed sovereign he attempts to
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demonstrate that the sultan lacks the ability to control or even reign them in, writing “in travelling
from one capital to the other [the sultan] has invariably to make a huge detour by the coast in order
to escape the depredations of these fierce and war-like mountaineers.”228 As in the previously
examined European accounts, what Spilsbury is challenging in these passages is implicitly the
notion of a state monopoly over force. He is making claims about a lack of sovereignty by showing
the sultan as the victim of stronger domestic military forces.
Spilsbury also dwells on graphic descriptions of physical punishments practiced by the
makhzan authorities. For example, in one passage he describes the ordeal of the salt, a favorite topic
for European travelers attempting to depict the Moroccan government as cruel and “barbaric.”
According to Spilsbury, in order to punish certain offenders “The executioner cuts three or four
gashes in the palm of the victim's right hand, then closes the hand over a lump of salt, or quicklime,
and binds up the whole with strips of raw green hide. These strips as they dry in the air, contract till
the fingers are forced through the palm, the salt or quicklime adding to the agony of the torture.”229
The explicit detail of this section along with its inclusion in a narrative that is ostensibly about
Spilsbury’s own experiences (he never witnessed it in person) shows the rhetorical intent of this
passage is to shock and horrify his reader, presumably into a condemnation of the Moroccan legal
system. Coincidentally, that legal system is the same one that charged Spilsbury with inciting
rebellion, so he clearly had a vested interest in persuading his readers to repudiate it. Through this
strategy he also seems to appeal explicitly to the other branch of informal empire identified by
Gallagher and Robinson – humanitarian groups which sought British influence abroad as part of a
“civilizing mission.”230
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Finally, Spilsbury spends a significant amount of time attacking the sultan’s claims to the
Sous specifically. He reiterates ad nauseum his belief that the tribes do not recognize the sultan,
though oddly he never puts those words into the mouth of any of the Sousi men with whom he
interacts. His central arguments for this claim are summarized in the following passage:
I have always upheld the view that the tribes of Sous do not recognise the authority
of the Sultan, and are de facto independent, since in the first place the Moorish Government
does not include the Sous in that portion of its dominions which is affected by the treaty
with Great Britain, for they will not allow any foreigner, if they can help it, to travel, trade
and reside in that district ; they have no effective means of governing or collecting taxes,
except by occasional armed incursions into the country, which have rarely met with
anything but temporary success.
Essentially, Spilsbury asserts that the only reason Europeans were not allowed to enter the Sous
was because the sultan was unable to militarily control the tribes there. While he does allow for the
sultan’s mahallas to the region, he depicts these as raids rather than tools of governance. He
develops this idea further in another passage, stating “While I was in Morocco one of the many
expeditions for collecting taxes was despatched over the Atlas to the Sous country, where the
Sultan's authority is not recognised by the tribes, except in the immediate neighbourhood of
Tarudant [Taroudant], and where tax collecting is only a polite term for wholesale rapine and
slaughter.”231 By associating the mahallas with theft and wanton violence, rather than a legitimate
application of force, Spilsbury denies they satisfy the rubric he has established for sovereignty. In a
different passage he expands, explicitly claiming that occupation is required in order for a power to
be sovereign, seemingly in reference to the 1885 Treaty of Berlin. He writes, “if, as in the rest of
Africa, sovereignty is only recognised where there is efficient occupation of a district, then the
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Sultan's rights are confined to Tarudant [Taroundant] and its district, for beyond occasional raids…
his authority is absolutely nil.”232 Spilsbury’s confidence in his understanding of sovereignty was
astounding. Not only did he make the same arguments regarding sovereignty to almost every
British official he interacted with, but, at least according to himself, during an audience with Ba
Ahmad he “pointed out that at present the rights of the Mahksen [makhzan] over the tribes were of
a very shadowy nature and were not recognised by the tribes.”233 It seems questionable at best
whether he would have truly been so blunt with the effective ruler of Morocco, but at the very least
his presenting this encounter to his readers reinforces the apparent strength of his conviction.
The last major point Spilsbury makes about Moroccan sovereignty revolves around the
Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1895. From the beginning, Spilsbury makes the false assertion that the
British recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the coast as far as Boujdour was not made until
1899, after his excursion to the Sous. He also repeatedly raises the Spanish claim to the
unidentified, historic settlement of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequefia in the 1860 Treaty of Tetouan,
arguing that the British could not legally grant recognition to Morocco of territory that might have
been ceded to Spain.234 This line of legalistic argument serves as a final backstop to his other
approaches. Should his reader not accept his qualitative descriptions of Morocco as evidence of
misrule and barbarism that rendered the sultan unfit to govern, nor his Weberian-style arguments
about the lack of military occupation and monopoly on force, then the contradiction of the two
treaties should suggest that at best, sovereignty in the area was legally murky.
Spilsbury’s account is first and foremost attempt to exonerate himself. Any claims he makes
about Moroccan sovereignty seem based in the desire to prove to the public that he did nothing
wrong. Instead he plays the victim claiming abuse at the hands of a weak and misguided British
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Foreign Office and a cruel and vindictive Moroccan government. Nevertheless, in composing these
arguments, Spilsbury joined the ranks of authors contesting the notion of Moroccan sovereignty in
the Sous at the end of the nineteenth century. While Spilsbury uses the same rhetorical devices and
evaluative framework found other Western accounts, he is distinguished by acting against rather
than on behalf of a political power. Additionally, the notoriety generated by his trial along with the
availability of his book to the general public, ensured his narrative had far more influence on public
opinion in the Anglophone world than did, for instance, the consular reports in the prior chapter.

Grey’s Account
The other account of the Tourmaline Incident was published in 1899 immediately following
Spilsbury’s trial. In it, the author, Henry M. Grey, one of the men who had been left at Arksis and
then arrested and sentenced to four months imprisonment, tried to respond to some of the
elements in Spilsbury’s version of the events. Like Spilsbury, Grey was outraged at the Foreign
Office and the Government of Morocco, but he also had a bone to pick with Spilsbury, himself, as he
blamed Spilsbury for leaving him on the shore where he was subsequently captured.235
Furthermore, part of Grey’s defense revolved around claiming to have been duped by Spilsbury and
the Syndicate into what he did not know was an illegal enterprise.236 Though Grey’s account
competes with Spilsbury’s in terms of the details of events, they are of one accord with relationship
to the sultan’s sovereignty in the Sous. Grey uses a few different devices from Spilsbury in making
his case for the independence of the Sous though many of his lines of argument echo Spilsbury’s.
One novel technique Grey utilizes to underscore what he sees as the separateness of the
Sous is differentiating the demonyms he uses for its inhabitants from those he uses for the people
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living in what he considers Morocco. Specifically, while Spilsbury refers to both groups as Moors,
Grey consistently refers to the Moroccans as Moors, but to the Sousi tribesmen as either the Sousi
or Berbers. This distinction is highlighted in a number of passages like the following where the two
groups are compared to one another, “the Sousi had plenty of money, but that they, like the Moors,
were treacherous in the extreme.”237 By continuously placing the groups in contrast, Grey
reinforces his assertion that the two are fundamentally different and belong to two different
nations, a particularly potent concept in the late nineteenth century as the idea of the nation state
was taking root. Grey also builds on this concept through a comparison to the Irish. He writes that
“Like the Irish, they [the Sousi tribes] have their burning question of Home Rule, and their
discussions suggested the proceedings of an Irish Parliament.”238 By equating the question of
sovereignty in the Sous to that in Ireland, Grey makes the conflict relatable for his readers in
Britain. Through this connection he is also able to map on the assertion that, like the Irish, the Sousi
are an occupied people and whether or not they are temporarily beneath the rule of the sultan, they
are a separate nation that longs for independence.
Grey also presents a number of arguments we have seen in other accounts. Like Spilsbury,
he draws attention to what he calls “terrible conditions of life that [they] obtain under the
autocratic and tyrannical rule of the descendant of the Prophet.”239 By attacking the quality of life
and system of government, Grey is really attacking the legitimacy of the sultan’s regime. He also
positions Europeans as benevolent saviors, who ameliorate the conditions in the country through
their presence: “the influence of European civilization has, however, done something of late years
towards mitigating these and similar horrors in Northern Morocco.”240 Additionally, he makes the
distinction we have seen before between the acknowledgement of religious and political authority,
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asserting “Throughout Sous the sovereignty of the sultan is recognised only in spiritual matters. He
is the acknowledged head of the Church, but in temporal matters each tribe is a republic, governed
by its Ait Arbain, or Council of Forty, elected from among its members.”241 The choice of “republic”
echoes Consul Matthews’ use of the same word and again is implicitly contrasted with the
“autocracy” of the sultanate. Like the Irish comparison, Grey’s use of “republic” familiarizes the
Sous, making it seem to fit into Western political structures.
Though Grey’s narrative is much longer than Spilsbury’s, much of it is given over to the
description of his imprisonment and his various marches. The final chapter, however, is largely a
critique of the Foreign Office’s approach to the whole affair. Rather than commenting on the
political reality of existent treaties, Grey makes the argument that Britain should put its
international prestige and commercial interests above diplomacy. This argument again highlights
his role as one of the informal agents seeking to drive Britain into the pursuit of empire. To some
extent, he seems not to care whether the Moroccan claims to the Sous are legitimate. Regardless, he
claims the British consuls should have backed the endeavor and taken a strong stance against the
Moroccans. Instead, having failed to do so, he asserts Britain has appeared weak especially in
comparison to Germany, which simply released their citizen without trial or reprimand.242
Grey’s account like Spilsbury’s demonstrates a rejection of British policy while at the same
time playing a vital role in shaping discourse around international recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty in the Sous. Excerpts from Grey’s book were published around the world further
internationalizing what was initially a domestic question in Morocco.243 Like other accounts,
through his contestation of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sous, Grey actually contributed to the
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construction of limitations on that sovereignty even if he did so on his own behalf rather than for a
government.

Conclusion
The Tourmaline incident offers an exceptional lens into the dynamics that defined the
negotiation of political authority and especially sovereignty in the Sous at the end of the nineteenth
century. The event itself demonstrated the continued willingness of the Sousi tribes to engage with
European traders in spite of the sultan’s prohibition, challenging his secular authority. It also
showed the ways in which the British imperialism of free trade through informal empire stressed
the relationships between the central makhzan authorities and local leaders on the periphery. The
two accounts of the expedition by Grey and Spilsbury also provide an opportunity to explore the
ways in which documents that are not aligned with official policy nevertheless impact the
construction of political concepts such as sovereignty.
Grey and Spilsbury’s narratives contributed to the process of constructing and defining
Moroccan sovereignty in spite of, or rather because of, their opposition to the British government.
The ability of these informal documents to engage in the same process as diplomatic ones
demonstrates how the documentary act itself is imbued with constitutive power, rather than being
invested with it by the political power that promotes it. Rather than serving a national political
agenda, Grey and Spilsbury’s accounts serve personal ones. This difference, though, in no way
precluded them from engaging in the same debate as the consuls or royal historians from the
previous chapter.

84
Conclusion: The Impact of British Informal Empire on Makhzan/Siba
In the late nineteenth century, the Moroccan central government faced a novel threat.
English trading companies as part of the larger phenomenon of British informal empire
increasingly raised challenges to Morocco’s political authority along the southern periphery of the
state. By enticing local elites to renounce the sultan’s authority in order to gain access to lucrative
customs-free trading agreements, these companies repeatedly triggered domestic crises that
required the Moroccan sultan to change the kind of authority he practiced both internally and
externally in order to better ensure his control over trade. At the same time, the makhzan became
embroiled in a contest of narratives about the changes that were taking place. While the makhzan
attempted to demonstrate the continuity of Moroccan political authority in the region, Western
authors, both within and outside official channels, cast aspersions on the validity of this authority,
both because it differed from the definition of sovereignty that had gained currency in Europe
during this period, particularly in the wake of the Berlin Conference, and because doing so served
imperial political agendas.
The changes in the kind of political authority employed by the sultan discussed in this paper
and the narrative contestation that accompanied them then directly influenced the concept of bilad
al-siba developed by French colonial scholars and applied to southern Morocco in the beginning of
the twentieth century. In attempting to understand “traditional” Morocco, such incidents informed
French beliefs about the relationship between the Sultan and the Sous, meaning the phenomenon of
British informal empire was at least a factor in the creation of the makhzan/siba dichotomy. For
example, one of the most influential early treatises on southern Morocco that laid the foundation
for the French theorization of an Arab/Amazigh makhzan/siba was that of Colonel Léopold
Justinard, a French military officer. Justinard, explicitly references European travel accounts
depicting the 1882 mahalla and its connection the English trading companies while claiming that it
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was an invasion of territory that had previously been beyond the borders of the sultanate.244
Montagne, too, one of the chief propagators of the theory, writes about relationship between the
makhzan and Husayn bin Hashim, calling them enemies, a characterization that probably stems
from the kinds of Western accounts presented here.245 Though these incidents may have involved
the British rather than the French, it seems likely that they least somewhat influenced French
perceptions of the connection between the sultan and southern Morocco. By raising the question of
Moroccan political authority, particularly within the European framework of sovereignty, to the
international stage, British merchants involved in the processes of British informal empire
contributed to the creation of ambiguity in Western understandings of the relationship between
southern Morocco and the rest of the country. This ambiguity, in turn, led to the need somehow
articulate a theory of the historical Moroccan sultanate in which certain regions could at once be
included and excluded from the state. Ultimately, French colonial scholars resolved this need
through the creation of the notion of bilad al-siba, a label which has stuck ever since.
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